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THE CONSENSUS MYTH
IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE REFORM
Benjamin Levin*
It has become popular to identify a “consensus” on criminal justice reform, 
but how deep is that consensus, actually? This Article argues that the pur-
ported consensus is much more limited than it initially appears. Despite 
shared reformist vocabulary, the consensus rests on distinct critiques that 
identify different flaws and justify distinct policy solutions. The underlying 
disagreements transcend traditional left/right political divides and speak to 
deeper disputes about the state and the role of criminal law in society. 
The Article maps two prevailing, but fundamentally distinct, critiques of 
criminal law: (1) the quantitative approach (what I call the “over” frame); 
and (2) the qualitative approach (what I call the “mass” frame). The “over” 
frame grows from a belief that criminal law has an important and legitimate 
function, but that the law’s operations have exceeded that function. This cri-
tique assumes that there are optimal rates of incarceration and criminaliza-
tion, but the current criminal system is suboptimal in that it has criminalized 
too much and incarcerated too many. In contrast, the “mass” frame focuses 
on criminal law as a sociocultural phenomenon. This reformist frame indi-
cates that the issue is not a mere miscalculation; rather, reforms should ad-
dress how the system marginalizes populations and exacerbates both power 
imbalances and distributional inequities.
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To show how these frames differ, this Article applies the “over” and the 
“mass” critique, in turn, to the maligned phenomena of mass incarceration 
and overcriminalization. The existing literature on mass incarceration and 
overcriminalization displays an elision between these two frames. Some 
scholars and reformers have adopted one frame exclusively, while others use 
the two interchangeably. No matter how much scholars and critics bemoan 
the troubles of mass incarceration and overcriminalization, it is hard to be-
lieve that they can achieve meaningful reform if they are talking about fun-
damentally different problems. 
While many scholars may adopt an “over” frame in an effort to attract a 
broader range of support or appeal to politicians, “over” policy proposals do 
not necessarily reach deeper “mass” concerns. Ultimately, this Article argues 
that a pragmatic turn to the “over” frame may have significant costs in legit-
imating deeper structural flaws and failing to address distributional issues of 
race, class, and power at the heart of the “mass” critique.
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Introduction
We live in an era of mass incarceration. Since the early 1970s, the crimi-
nal justice system has expanded rapidly, disproportionately affecting poor 
people of color.1 A growing chorus of criminal law scholars, judges, policy-
makers, and activists increasingly agree that “too many Americans go to too 
1. See generally Devah Pager, Marked: Race, Crime, and Finding Work in an 
Era of Mass Incarceration (2007); William J. Stuntz, The Collapse of American 
Criminal Justice (2011); Bruce Western, Punishment and Inequality in America
(2006); Rachel Barkow, The Criminal Regulatory State, in The New Criminal Justice 
Thinking 33 (Sharon Dolovich & Alexandra Natapoff eds., 2017).
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many prisons for far too long.”2 We also live in an era of overcriminaliza-
tion. During this same time period, state and federal criminal codes have ex-
panded rapidly to the point where no one knows how many criminal laws
actually are on the books.3 Most adults have—knowingly or unknowingly—
committed a jailable offense.4
But what are “mass incarceration” and “overcriminalization”? They un-
doubtedly are significant concepts in both policy and academic circles, not to 
mention in the popular imagination. Michelle Alexander’s The New Jim 
Crow: Mass Incarceration in the Age of Colorblindness,5 the critically ac-
claimed documentary 13th,6 and a growing body of legal scholarship have 
popularized “mass incarceration” as a description of the current structure 
and operation of the criminal system.7 Similarly, overcriminalization as a 
concept has gained traction. Congress has convened a task force on over-
criminalization,8 and the Heritage Foundation, the Association of Criminal 
Defense Attorneys, and other groups have produced extensive reports diag-
nosing overcriminalization as one of the primary pathologies afflicting the 
2. Attorney General Eric Holder, Address at the American Bar Association Annual 
Meeting (Aug. 12, 2013), quoted in Charlie Savage, Justice Dept. Seeks to Curtail Stiff Drug Sen-
tences, N.Y. Times (Aug. 12, 2013), https://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/12/us/justice-dept-
seeks-to-curtail-stiff-drug-sentences.html (on file with the Michigan Law Review). See generally
United States v. Young, 766 F.3d 621, 630–34 (6th Cir. 2014) (Stranch, J., concurring); United 
States v. Valdovinos, 760 F.3d 322, 330–41 (4th Cir. 2014) (Davis, J., dissenting); Nat’l Re-
search Council, The Growth of Incarceration in the United States: Exploring 
Causes and Consequences (2014); Barack Obama, Commentary, The President’s Role in Ad-
vancing Criminal Justice Reform, 130 Harv. L. Rev. 811 (2017); Jed S. Rakoff, Why Innocent 
People Plead Guilty, N.Y. Rev. Books (Nov. 20, 2014), http://www.nybooks.com/articles/2014/
11/20/why-innocent-people-plead-guilty/ [https://perma.cc/9PVM-KSD8].
3. See, e.g., Douglas Husak, Overcriminalization: The Limits of the Crimi-
nal Law (2008); Andrew Ashworth, Conceptions of Overcriminalization, 5 Ohio St. J. Crim. 
L. 407 (2008).
4. See generally Harvey A. Silverglate, Three Felonies a Day: How the Feds 
Target the Innocent (2009).
5. Michelle Alexander, The New Jim Crow: Mass Incarceration in the 
Age of Colorblindness (2010).
6. 13th (Kandoo Films 2016).
7. See, e.g., Devon W. Carbado, Predatory Policing, 85 UMKC L. Rev. 545, 549 (2017) 
(“Today, mass incarceration rolls comfortably off the tongues of people of all ideological 
stripes.”); James Forman, Jr., Racial Critiques of Mass Incarceration: Beyond the New Jim Crow,
87 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 21 (2012) [hereinafter Forman, Racial Critiques]; Ian F. Haney López, Post-
Racial Racism: Racial Stratification and Mass Incarceration in the Age of Obama, 98 Calif. L. 
Rev. 1023 (2010); Dorothy E. Roberts, The Social and Moral Cost of Mass Incarceration in Af-
rican American Communities, 56 Stan. L. Rev. 1271 (2004); Andrew E. Taslitz, The Criminal 
Republic: Democratic Breakdown as a Cause of Mass Incarceration, 9 Ohio St. J. Crim. L. 133 
(2011).
8. See Defining the Problem and Scope of Over-Criminalization and Over-
Federalization: Hearing Before the Over-Criminalization Task Force of 2013 of the H. Comm. on 
the Judiciary, 113th Cong. (2013).
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U.S. criminal system.9 Legal scholars have organized numerous overcrimi-
nalization conferences,10 and the phrase appears in law review articles writ-
ten by academics of differing political and methodological commitments.11
Yet, despite their prevalence in scholarly and policy discussions, these 
two phenomena are ill-defined. In different debates they appear to have very 
different meanings. And it is not uncommon for a single article to contain a 
great deal of slippage in its treatment of what constitutes overcriminalization 
or mass incarceration. While there are a plethora of definitions and ap-
proaches, two stand out: (1) a quantitative approach focused on calibration 
(i.e., there may be an optimal rate of incarceration or criminalization, but the 
current rate is too high); and (2) a more qualitative or sociological approach 
(i.e., the phenomena reflect a flawed method of managing populations via 
criminal law, resulting in significant social costs reflected across axes of class, 
gender, sexuality, and race). This definitional inconsistency is not simply a 
matter of theoretical or semantic imprecision. As descriptive terms (i.e.,
“mass incarceration” and “overcriminalization”) that carry significant nor-
mative weight, their definitions matter. Uncertainty as to the nature of the 
phenomena poses significant real-world problems—fixing either of these 
problems requires an accurate understanding of the problem itself, and defi-
nitional differences yield vastly different policy solutions.
This Article seeks to address the inconsistency by mapping the two 
prevalent critiques or critical tendencies: (1) the quantitative approach (what 
I will call the “over” frame); and (2) the qualitative approach (what I will call 
the “mass” frame). The over frame takes many forms but—at its core—is 
rooted in a belief that the criminal law has an important and legitimate func-
tion, but that it has exceeded that function. There is an optimal rate of incar-
ceration and an optimal rate of criminalization, but the current criminal sys-
9. Heritage Explains: Overcriminalization, Heritage Found., https://www.
heritage.org/crime-and-justice/heritage-explains/overcriminalization [https://perma.cc/L6DB-
TXMT]; Overcriminalization, Nat’l Ass’n Crim. Def. Law., http://www.nacdl.org/overcrim
[https://perma.cc/B22H-GLD5]; Overcriminalization, Right on Crime, http://rightoncrime
.com/category/priorityissues/overcriminalization/ [https://perma.cc/K8SX-NY5W]; Overcrim-
inalization, Tex. Pub. Pol’y Found., http://old.texaspolicy.com/issues/overcriminalization
[https://perma.cc/RE5A-4LMB]; Task Force on Overcriminalization, Am. B. Ass’n, https://
www.americanbar.org/groups/litigation/initiatives/overcriminalization.html [https://perma.cc/
54MP-D7AZ].
10. Inst. for Humane Studies & The Tex. Pub. Policy Found., The Shared Burden 
of Overcriminalization (2017), http://theihs.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/IHS_Booklet
_TPPF_Full.pdf [https://perma.cc/9XQ5-82BL].
11. See, e.g., Sara Sun Beale, Essay, The Many Faces of Overcriminalization: From Morals 
and Mattress Tags to Overfederalization, 54 Am. U. L. Rev. 747 (2005); Jennifer M. Chacón, 
Overcriminalizing Immigration, 102 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 613 (2012); Erik Luna, The 
Overcriminalization Phenomenon, 54 Am. U. L. Rev. 703 (2005); Glenn Harlan Reynolds, 
Ham Sandwich Nation: Due Process When Everything Is a Crime, 113 Colum. L. Rev. Side-
bar 102 (2013), https://columbialawreview.org/content/ham-sandwich-nation-due-process-
when-everything-is-a-crime/ [https://perma.cc/VZW9-TXEG].
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tem is sub- (or, perhaps extra-) optimal in that it has criminalized too much 
and incarcerated too many. The mass frame, on the other hand, focuses on 
the criminal system as a sociocultural phenomenon.12 The issue is not a mis-
calibration;13 rather, it is that criminal law is doing ill by marginalizing 
populations and exacerbating troubling power dynamics and distributional 
inequities.14 Every incarcerated person might have been guilty of the charged 
offense, and the critique would still hold. 
The existing literature on mass incarceration and overcriminalization 
displays a troubling elision between these two frames. Some scholars and re-
formers have adopted one frame exclusively, while others use the two inter-
changeably. While it has become popular to identify the current moment as 
one of “bipartisan consensus” on criminal justice reform,15 it is important to 
recognize how tenuous this consensus is and how much it relies upon differ-
ent frames and different goals.16 No matter how much scholars bemoan the 
troubles of mass incarceration and overcriminalization, it is hard to believe 
that meaningful reform can occur if they are talking about fundamentally 
different problems.
To be clear, my claim is not that these two frames or approaches are 
wholly distinct or incompatible. Indeed, the over approach might (and does) 
add specificity and substance to the mass approach—data puts meat on the 
bones of what might otherwise be a gestural skeleton.17 Likewise, the mass
approach might add theoretical backing to the over approach, helping to il-
12. See Alexandra Natapoff, The Penal Pyramid, in The New Criminal Justice 
Thinking, supra note 1, at 71 (“[S]ocio-legal theories of power, social control, race, and insti-
tutional structure better explain the criminal process and predict its outcomes.”).
13. See generally Paul Butler, The System Is Working the Way It Is Supposed to: The Lim-
its of Criminal Justice Reform, 104 Geo. L.J. 1419 (2016).
14. See Stephanos Bibas, Improve, Dynamite, or Dissolve the Criminal Regulatory State?,
in The New Criminal Justice Thinking, supra note 1, at 61, 64–65 (describing this view).
15. See, e.g., Jessica M. Eaglin, The Drug Court Paradigm, 53 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 595, 636 
n.298 (2016); Carl Takei, From Mass Incarceration to Mass Control, and Back Again: How Bi-
partisan Criminal Justice Reform May Lead to a For-Profit Nightmare, 20 U. Pa. J.L. & Soc. 
Change 125, 126–27 (2017); Attorney General Eric Holder, Remarks at the National Press 
Club (Feb. 17, 2015), in 27 Fed. Sent’g Rep. 297, 299 (2015) (“[I]n the preliminary data we’ve 
seen—and the growing, bipartisan consensus surrounding the work that’s underway—they 
prove unequivocally that criminal justice reform is an idea whose time has finally come.”); Alex 
Altman, Criminal Justice Reform Is Becoming Washington’s Bipartisan Cause, Time (Feb. 19, 
2015), http://time.com/3714876/criminal-justice-reform-is-becoming-washingtons-bipartisan-
cause/ (on file with the Michigan Law Review).
16. See generally Marie Gottschalk, Caught: The Prison State and the 
Lockdown of American Politics (2015) (critiquing the consensus narrative and offering a 
skeptical treatment of conservative reform movements).
17. See, e.g., Benjamin Levin, Values and Assumptions in Criminal Adjudication, 129 
Harv. L. Rev. F. 379, 387 (2016); Tracey L. Meares & Bernard E. Harcourt, Foreword: Trans-
parent Adjudication and Social Science Research in Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 90 J. 
Crim. L. & Criminology 733, 735 (2000).
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lustrate the effects of an error in calculation.18 And many scholars, articles, 
and books may reflect sympathy or affinity for different tendencies when 
faced with different issues or different audiences.
But just because the two approaches might be complementary does not 
mean that they are consistent or congruent. Thinking in over terms means 
constructing policy solutions designed to reach optimal rates. In turn, reach-
ing optimal rates requires a consensus on what an optimal rate is. Thinking 
in mass terms, on the other hand, invites a more radical or totalizing critique 
of the current system and its institutions. If criminal law inherently func-
tions to marginalize or subjugate poor people of color, it is not clear that im-
prisoning fewer black men or increasing enforcement in affluent white 
neighborhoods, for example, would remedy deeper structural inequalities in 
society. Instead, the mass frame invites a deeper reckoning with questions of 
political economy to address the levers of power and the distribution of re-
sources in society. Over solutions might help mass problems, but they need 
not.19 And, importantly, the two critiques operate on different planes and 
invite solutions of vastly different magnitudes. 
In setting up the typology, this Article proceeds in four Parts. First, Part 
I introduces the mass and over frames, situating them (and the typology it-
self) within the growing critical literature on the criminal system. Next, Part 
II describes scholarly critiques of the criminal system rooted in the language 
of mass incarceration. This Part presents a brief genealogy of the phrase 
“mass incarceration” before teasing out the critiques that fall into the mass
and over frames. Part III employs a similar approach to overcriminalization. 
This Part addresses economistic language and approach, while also noting 
the ways in which moral philosophers and some theories-of-punishment
scholars have adopted a similar discourse on optimal rates of punishment. 
The literature on overcriminalization (unsurprisingly) generally adopts the 
over frame, but I argue that some of the overcriminalization literature can 
(or should) be read as focusing not on overcriminalization, but on masscrim-
inalization. In Part IV, I argue that the over frame has gained ground, partic-
ularly in discussions of mass incarceration. This Part examines the ways in 
which this mis-framing has led to a flawed “standard story”20 of what is 
wrong with the criminal system. Further, this Part contends that the over
frame conceals hard and deeply politicized questions about the role of the 
state and the proper function of criminal law. The over frame intuitively may 
18. Cf. Deborah Jones Merritt, Correspondence, Constitutional Fact and Theory: A Re-
sponse to Chief Judge Posner, 97 Mich. L. Rev. 1287, 1287 (1999) (“[E]mpirical knowledge is 
most useful in unmasking the theoretical assumptions that undergird constitutional law . . . .”). 
Further mass critiques still rest on an empirical claim about the size and scope of the problem. 
See infra note 76 and accompanying text.
19. But, as this Article discusses, over solutions are not always responsive to mass con-
cerns, and may even exacerbate mass problems. See generally infra Section IV.A.
20. See John F. Pfaff, Locked In: The True Causes of Mass Incarceration—
and How to Achieve Real Reform (2017).
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have a pragmatic appeal, but ultimately, I argue that the turn to an over
frame is not costless—it legitimates deep structural flaws in the criminal sys-
tem and misses the opportunity to consider larger reform projects.21
I. Mapping Criminal Justice Critiques
The conventional account of criminal law scholarship is that it operates 
as a sort of echo chamber: there is a consensus that the criminal system is 
(with a few notable exceptions)22 too harsh and should be reformed.23 Schol-
ars focused on larger institutional questions tend to decry the current regime 
as ineffective, racially disparate, and “broken.”24 This Article challenges that 
conventional account. Many scholars undoubtedly begin from this critical 
posture,25 but that baseline agreement belies deeper disagreements with real 
21. On the concept of “legitimation” in criminal law, see generally Paul D. Butler, Essay, 
Poor People Lose: Gideon and the Critique of Rights, 122 Yale L.J. 2176, 2189 (2013), and Car-
ol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Sober Second Thoughts: Reflections on Two Decades of Consti-
tutional Regulation of Capital Punishment, 109 Harv. L. Rev. 355, 429–32 (1995).
22. See William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 Mich. L. Rev.
505, 507 (2001) (noting the “important exception of sexual assault”). Notably, these exceptions 
tend to be areas in which progressive or left-leaning scholars favor criminalization that they 
frame as exceptional—notably, sexual assault, domestic violence, hate crimes, and environ-
mental and financial crimes. See, e.g., Susan Estrich, Rape, 95 Yale L.J. 1087 (1986); Mary 
Kreiner Ramirez, Prioritizing Justice: Combating Corporate Crime from Task Force to Top Pri-
ority, 93 Marq. L. Rev. 971, 972 (2010) (criticizing “[i]nadequate law enforcement against 
corporate criminals”); Amy J. Sepinwall, Guilty by Proxy: Expanding the Boundaries of Respon-
sibility in the Face of Corporate Crime, 63 Hastings L.J. 411 (2012); Deborah Tuerkheimer, 
Underenforcement as Unequal Protection, 57 B.C. L. Rev. 1287, 1289 (2016). In the context of 
each of these crimes, support tends to rest on arguments that the victims are particularly pow-
erless or marginalized by the legal system and/or that criminal law is necessary to help advance 
desirable social ends. See, e.g., Randall Kennedy, Race, Crime, and the Law 19 (1997); 
Aya Gruber, The Feminist War on Crime, 92 Iowa L. Rev. 741, 825 (2007); Tania Tetlow, Dis-
criminatory Acquittal, 18 Wm. & Mary Bill Rts. J. 75, 78 (2009).
23. Throughout the Article, I refer to the structures of criminal law’s enforcement and 
administration as a “system.” I do so mindful of the compelling critiques of systems theory in 
this context. See, e.g., Benjamin Levin, Rethinking the Boundaries of “Criminal Justice,” 15
Ohio St. J. Crim. L. 619 (2018) (reviewing The New Criminal Justice Thinking, supra note 
1); Sara Mayeux, The Idea of the “Criminal Justice System,” Am. J. Crim. L. (forthcoming 
2018), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3050263 [https://perma.cc/M7
WR-BEUW] (same); Bernard E. Harcourt, The Influence of Systems Analysis on Criminal Law 
and Procedure: A Critique of a Style of Judicial Decision-Making (Columbia Pub. Law Research 
Paper No. 14-562, 2017), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3062900
[https://perma.cc/ZP4W-LH72] (tracing the use of “criminal justice system” as a concept in 
legal and social thought). However, given that most of the literature and activism that I analyze 
adopts that formulation and offers a “systemic” critique, I continue to use the terms “criminal 
system” or “criminal justice system.”
24. See generally Stuntz, supra note 1.
25. There certainly are scholars and commentators active in criminal justice debates 
who do not share these baseline critiques, or who do so only very narrowly. See, e.g., William 
G. Otis, The Case Against the Smarter Sentencing Act, 26 Fed. Sent’g Rep. 302 (2014); William 
Otis, Sentencing Reform: Let’s Keep What We Know Works and Avoid What We Know Fails, 28 
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consequences for criminal justice reform.26 Further, to the extent that other 
scholars and commentators have questioned the “bipartisan consensus,” they 
have done so along predictable left/right grounds.27 That is, this skeptical lit-
erature tends to conclude that mapping disagreement boils down to differ-
ences between political left and right.28 But that account is not quite right. 
The mass and over critiques that this Article describes do not accord neatly 
with U.S. political parties or conventional packages of views.29 Instead, they 
reflect deeper beliefs about the role of the state and the proper function of 
the criminal system that reject easy political categorization. 
To tease out these points of disagreement, this Article examines two 
phenomena that have received widespread scholarly and political criticism: 
mass incarceration and overcriminalization. Both “mass incarceration” and 
“overcriminalization” have become common buzzwords in criminal law 
scholarship and in criminal justice policy circles,30 but neither phrase ap-
pears to have a fixed meaning.31 Instead, each phrase has a fluid definition, 
Fed. Sent’g Rep. 219 (2016); J. Harvie Wilkinson III, Essay, In Defense of American Criminal 
Justice, 67 Vand. L. Rev. 1099 (2014).
26. See Nicola Lacey, Humanizing the Criminal Justice Machine: Re-Animated Justice or 
Frankenstein’s Monster?, 126 Harv. L. Rev. 1299, 1299 (2013) (reviewing Stephanos Bibas,
The Machinery of Criminal Justice (2012)) (“[T]hat the system is in urgent need of reform 
marks the limit of scholarly consensus. As soon as one moves to specifics—to analysis of the 
particular ways in which the system is defective or problematic; to interpretation of why these 
defects or problems have arisen; and perhaps above all, to elaboration of possible solutions and 
institutional reforms—one encounters not only the sort of variety that is to be expected in any 
vibrant field of scholarship, but also fundamental differences of diagnosis and prescription.”).
27. But see Joshua Kleinfeld, Reconstructivism: The Place of Criminal Law in Ethical Life,
129 Harv. L. Rev. 1485, 1551 (2016) (arguing that differences among utilitarians, retributiv-
ists, and others complicate the consensus).
28. See, e.g., Gottschalk, supra note 16, at xv.
29. That said, as I discuss later, the mass frame tends to reflect some sort of left critique 
of social and economic inequality (broadly conceived). See infra notes 58–59. It is conceivable 
to me that there could be some right-leaning version of the mass critique (i.e., identifying a 
different set of deep structural issues in U.S. political economy and criminal justice policy), but 
I have been unable to identify such a critique in the literature. As discussed later, the over cri-
tique transcends traditional political distinction and is as much the province of the rights-
focused libertarian and the technocratic, progressive consequentialist.
30. See, e.g., Marie Gottschalk, The Prison and the Gallows: The Politics of 
Mass Incarceration in America (2006); James Forman, Jr., Why Care About Mass Incarcer-
ation?, 108 Mich. L. Rev. 993 (2010) (reviewing Paul Butler, Let’s Get Free: A Hip-Hop 
Theory of Justice (2009)); López, supra note 7, at 1028 n.21; Taslitz, supra note 7, at 133 
(“That the last several decades have seen an explosion of Americans’ reliance on imprisonment 
as a penal sanction is unquestioned. So vast has this expansion been that the term ‘mass incar-
ceration’ has entered scholarly vocabulary as a way of describing this phenomenon.”) (footnote 
omitted).
31. See, e.g., Pfaff, supra note 20, at 8 (“Although widely used, [mass incarceration] has 
no precise definition . . . .”); Todd Haugh, Overcriminalization’s New Harm Paradigm, 68 
Vand. L. Rev. 1191, 1197 (2015) (“For a phenomenon that has received so much sustained 
attention by legal scholars, identifying an accepted definition of overcriminalization is surpris-
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reflecting different critiques, concerns, and normative commitments in dif-
ferent contexts. This Part introduces what I take to be the two dominant ap-
proaches to these pathologies of the criminal system: over and mass. These 
approaches, frames, or tendencies reflect two different ways of conceptualiz-
ing what is wrong with the criminal system and how to address reform pro-
jects. To be clear, there are many ways to criticize the system, and the two 
frames I introduce here are not exhaustive and do not capture every critique. 
Further, scholars and commentators who generally apply one frame may 
sometimes apply another frame or may use different approaches for different 
audiences or different desired results.32
Nevertheless, the typology offered here maps the two major ideological 
frames through which scholars discuss the criminal justice system. The ty-
pology is an attempt to understand an otherwise fluid literature and to fix 
the commitments and approaches that currently dominate the field. To the 
extent that “criminal justice reform” has become a catchall category for a 
range of critiques, proposals, scholarship, and activism,33 it is critical that we 
understand what exactly needs to be reformed and to what end.34
Movements to alter sentencing policy, to address police violence, and to 
rewrite substantive criminal codes find support in declarations about schol-
arly and bipartisan consensus.35 But how broad and real is that consensus?36
ingly difficult.”); Mona Lynch, Mass Incarceration, Legal Change, and Locale: Understanding 
and Remediating American Penal Overindulgence, 10 Criminology & Pub. Pol’y 673, 673 n.2 
(2011) (“The concept of ‘mass incarceration,’ or ‘mass imprisonment,’ is not fully defined in 
the literature . . . .”); Kimberly Thomas, Interpersonal Power in the Criminal System, 50 Am. 
Crim. L. Rev. 247, 268 n.120 (2013); Anne R. Traum, Mass Incarceration at Sentencing, 64 
Hastings L.J. 423, 427 (2013) (tracking scholarly debate regarding the meaning and use of 
“mass incarceration”).
32. See generally infra Part IV. And, as noted above, every criminal law scholar is not 
necessarily critical of the system. See supra note 25.
33. See generally Katherine Beckett et al., The End of an Era? Understanding the Contra-
dictions of Criminal Justice Reform, 664 Annals Am. Acad. Pol. & Soc. Sci. 238 (2016).
34. Cf. Sharon Dolovich & Alexandra Natapoff, Introduction: Mapping the New Crimi-
nal Justice Thinking, in The New Criminal Justice Thinking, supra note 1, at 1 (making a 
similar argument regarding the definition of the criminal system’s scope); Harcourt, supra note 
23, at 5–7 (same); Mayeux, supra note 23, at 5–7 (same).
35. See, e.g., Samuel W. Buell, The Upside of Overbreadth, 83 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1491, 
1497–98 (2008); I. Bennett Capers, The Under-Policed, 51 Wake Forest L. Rev. 589, 590 
(2016); Erin R. Collins, Status Courts, 105 Geo. L.J. 1481, 1516 (2017); Andrew Manuel Cre-
spo, Regaining Perspective: Constitutional Criminal Adjudication in the U.S. Supreme Court,
100 Minn. L. Rev. 1985, 1997 (2016); Mary D. Fan, Beyond Budget-Cut Criminal Justice: The 
Future of Penal Law, 90 N.C. L. Rev. 581, 648 (2012); Kleinfeld, supra note 27, at 1550–51; Per-
ry L. Moriearty, Implementing Proportionality, 50 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 961, 991 (2017) (de-
scribing “a broad-based consensus that criminal justice reform is needed”); Obama, supra note 
2, at 822; Michelle S. Phelps, Possibilities and Contestation in Twenty-First-Century US Crimi-
nal Justice Downsizing, 12 Ann. Rev. L. & Soc. Sci. 153, 154 (2016); Norman L. Reimer, Will 
a Summer of Unease Halt the Momentum for Criminal Justice Reform?, Champion, Sept–Oct. 
2016, at 10, Westlaw, 40-Oct Champion 9; Christine S. Scott-Hayward, Shadow Sentencing: 
The Imposition of Federal Supervised Release, 18 Berkeley J. Crim. L. 180, 228 (2013); Stuntz, 
supra note 22, at 507; Wilkinson, supra note 25, at 1099–1100; Rachael Bade, Criminal Justice 
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Viewed from thirty thousand feet, one critique of criminal justice policy 
looks very similar to the next. And overstating nuance and difference might 
have an effect of stymieing change or discouraging cooperation among re-
formers and scholars with varying politics, methods, and commitments. But 
glossing over real differences and ignoring nuance ultimately undercuts co-
operation and effective reform as well.37 Without a clear diagnosis of the dis-
ease, how can anyone propose a cure? And, without appreciating differences 
in normative commitments and goals, how can we tell if a proposed reform 
is making the problem worse or moving the system in the right direction? 
In response to these questions, this Article maps the critical literature on 
the criminal system in terms of over and mass.38 The following chart pro-
Reform Gains Bipartisan Momentum, Politico (July 15, 2015, 5:15 AM), http://www.politico
.com/story/2015/07/criminal-justice-reform-gains-bipartisan-momentum-120125 [https://
perma.cc/6AMV-7GLN]; Radley Balko, Opinion, Here’s What Presidential Candidates’ Web-
sites Say About Criminal Justice Reform, Wash. Post: The Watch (Aug. 6, 2015), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-watch/wp/2015/08/06/heres-what-presidential-
candidates-websites-say-about-criminal-justice-reform/ (on file with the Michigan Law Re-
view) (“Criminal justice reform is the one issue that just about everyone seems to agree on 
right now.”).
36. See, e.g., Gottschalk, supra note 16; David Jaros, Flawed Coalitions and the Politics 
of Crime, 99 Iowa L. Rev. 1473, 1507 (2014); Scott-Hayward, supra note 35, at 228; Douglas A. 
Berman, Is It Really True that “Conservatives and Liberals Are Increasingly United” on Criminal 
Justice Reform?, Sent’g L. & Pol’y (Aug. 17, 2012, 10:07 AM), http://sentencing.typepad.com/
sentencing_law_and_policy/2012/08/is-it-really-true-that-conservatives-and-liberals-are-
increasingly-united-on-criminal-justice-reform.html [https://perma.cc/9N5E-QLME].
37. See, e.g., Allegra M. McLeod, Beyond the Carceral State, 95 Tex. L. Rev. 651, 664 
(2017) (reviewing Gottschalk, supra note 16); Takei, supra note 15, at 127 (“The left and the 
right, however, each come to this alliance with distinct and, ultimately, incompatible interests. 
Recently, the progressive advocacy community has begun to seriously grapple with the limits 
of the left-right alliance. This includes differences over whether and how to address policing 
practices and racial disparities in prosecutions, suspicions that conservatives are using decar-
ceration as a Trojan Horse to protect white-collar criminals, and disagreement about whether 
decarceration should be accompanied by increased societal investment in housing, employ-
ment opportunities, health care, and other social services.”).
38. To be clear, for some readers, over and mass as terms may carry the baggage of their 
association with other literatures. Nevertheless, in the analysis that follows, I use both terms 
advisedly to describe broader trends in or approaches to criminal justice critique.
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vides a rough description of the key properties that I associate with each 
frame: 
To put a finer point on it and to understand how the frames play out, 
the following chart provides a rough overview of this typology as it applies to 
several salient issues in criminal justice scholarship and criminal law reform:
I will return to this chart later when I examine the potential policy pro-
posals that respond to each frame. And I will address questions of incarcera-
tion and criminalization at much greater length and in much greater detail 
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in Parts II and III. But, for the time being, the chart is meant to illustrate that 
these frames may identify closely related problems but identify the core evil 
or the desired intervention in very different terms. 
The over frame treats criminal justice problems as a matter of degree 
that can be remedied by recalibrating the way that the system sorts among 
defendants, categorizes conduct, and punishes wrongdoing.39 The core prob-
lem to be addressed is one of scope. This line of critique emphasizes scope 
over structure. Former Attorney General Eric Holder’s claim that “too many 
Americans go to too many prisons for far too long”40 provides perhaps the 
most pithy encapsulation of the critique.41 Similarly, the mantra of conserva-
tive criminal justice reform activists—that the state should be “right on 
crime,” not “tough on crime”—speaks to a preference for “right sizing” the 
criminal system.42 The state has criminalized more conduct than traditional 
justifications for punishment warrant, so the problem might be remedied by 
criminalizing less conduct.43 An ideal legislature would adopt the proper 
theory of punishment and abolish all criminal statutes that do not serve that 
theory or justification. For example, if society were to adopt the harm prin-
ciple, then the legislature would be correct to criminalize conduct that 
caused harm, regardless of the harm to the defendant caused by punish-
ment.44 Similarly, the state incarcerates for too long because the desired ben-
39. See Stephen F. Smith, Overcoming Overcriminalization, 102 J. Crim. L. & Crimi-
nology 537, 539 (2012) (describing and critiquing this “quantitative” view of overcriminaliza-
tion).
40. Holder, supra note 2; see also Shon Hopwood, Clarity in Criminal Law, 54 Am. 
Crim. L. Rev. 695, 702 (2017) (describing “Congress’s penchant for passing too many criminal 
laws carrying sentences that are too long”).
41. See also Todd R. Clear, The Effects of High Imprisonment Rates on Communities, 37 
Crime & Just. 97, 125 (2008) (“The problem of mass incarceration is entirely produced by the 
simple mathematics of two pressure points—how many people enter prison and how long they 
stay there.”).
42. See, e.g., McLeod, supra note 37, at 668; Ellen S. Podgor, Introduction: Overcriminal-
ization; New Approaches to a Growing Problem, 102 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 529, 534 
(2012); Vikrant P. Reddy & Marc A. Levin, Right on Crime: A Return to First Principles for 
American Conservatives, 18 Tex. Rev. L. & Pol. 231 (2014); Statement of Principles, Right on 
Crime, http://www.rightoncrime.com/the-conservative-case-for-reform/statement-of-
principles/ [https://perma.cc/ZX8Y-FP4E].
43. See, e.g., Husak, supra note 3, at 3–4; Sanford H. Kadish, The Crisis of Overcriminal-
ization, 374 Annals Am. Acad. Pol. & Soc. Sci. 157 (1967); Paul J. Larkin, Jr., Regulation, 
Prohibition, and Overcriminalization: The Proper and Improper Uses of the Criminal Law, 42 
Hofstra L. Rev. 745, 745 (2014); Luna, supra note 11, at 712–13.
44. Cf. Michal Buchhandler-Raphael, Drugs, Dignity, and Danger: Human Dignity as a 
Constitutional Constraint to Limit Overcriminalization, 80 Tenn. L. Rev. 291, 294–95 (2013) 
(advocating for decriminalization of “victimless” crimes). As Bernard Harcourt has shown, 
however, applying such a principle is easier said than done. See Bernard E. Harcourt, The Col-
lapse of the Harm Principle, 90 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 109, 194 (1999); see also Harmelin
v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1002 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the 
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efits of incarceration could be obtained more quickly or without such an ex-
treme degree of punishment.45 Therefore, the state should recalibrate pun-
ishment to achieve the desired effect while reducing inefficient or unjustified 
incarceration.46
Perhaps the easiest way to appreciate and understand the over frame is 
to consider its poster child: the “nonviolent”47 drug offender.48 Viewed 
through this frame, the individual serving an extended prison sentence for a 
drug offense represents the apotheosis of the criminal system’s ills. She is be-
ing punished for conduct that is not necessarily morally blameworthy and 
does not necessarily have a victim (contra “violent” crime).49 Her conduct 
has been overcriminalized (because it could be regulated effectively non-
judgment); Eugene Volokh, Essay, Crime Severity and Constitutional Line-Drawing, 90 Va. L. 
Rev. 1957, 1969 (2004).
45. See, e.g., Frank O. Bowman, III, Beyond Band-Aids: A Proposal for Reconfiguring 
Federal Sentencing After Booker, 2005 U. Chi. Legal F. 149, 164; John Conyers, Jr., The Incar-
ceration Explosion, 31 Yale L. & Pol’y Rev. 377, 378 (2013) (“This mass incarceration is over-
incarceration. . . . [A] criminal justice system based on mass incarceration, in which we lock up 
more and more people, and particularly more people of color, with no crime reduction impact, 
and at a tremendous financial cost to our federal and state budgets, accomplishes none of those 
goals.” (emphasis omitted)); Chad Flanders, Reply, Can Retributivism Be Progressive?: A Reply 
to Professor Gray and Jonathan Huber, 70 Md. L. Rev. 166, 170 (2010); Timothy W. Floyd, Ste-
ven’s Choice, 10 Ohio St. J. Crim. L. 203, 203 (2012) (“Although prisons are a necessary evil, 
we imprison far too many people in our society, and for far too long.”); Jennifer Seltzer Stitt, 
Worth Fighting For: Keeping the Promise of Sentencing Reform, 23 Fed. Sent’g Rep. 126, 128 
(2010).
46. See Clear, supra note 41, at 125–26 (“If the problem of mass incarceration is the 
large number of people who go into prison and how long they stay there, then the solution is 
for fewer to go in and for shorter stays. In other words, the solution is not programmat-
ic . . . .”).
47. While such a discussion falls largely outside the scope of this Article, the distinction 
between violent and nonviolent crimes (and defendants) remains far from certain. See general-
ly Alice Ristroph, Criminal Law in the Shadow of Violence, 62 Ala. L. Rev. 571, 621 (2011). 
Therefore, even though categorizing a certain crime as “violent” and attaching severe punish-
ment and collateral consequences may have some intuitive appeal, it is not clear that courts 
and legislators have been successful in drawing these lines. See generally id.; Benjamin Levin, 
It’s Time to Rethink “Violent” Crime: How Mislabeling Misconduct Contributes to Our Bloated 
Criminal Justice System, Salon (June 19, 2016, 2:30 PM), http://www.salon.com/2016/06/19/
its_time_to_rethink_violent_crime_how_mislabeling_misconduct_contributes_to_our_
bloated_criminal_justice_system/ [https://perma.cc/4CD3-ZL6F]. Indeed, the Supreme Court 
continues to grapple with what constitutes a “crime of violence” for purpose of “career offend-
er” statutes. See, e.g., Beckles v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 886 (2017); Welch v. United States, 136 
S. Ct. 1257 (2016); Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015).
48. See James Forman Jr., Locking Up Our Own: Crime and Punishment in Black 
America 221–22, 228–31 (2017) [hereinafter Forman, Locking Up Our Own] (critiquing the 
“non-violent only” approach to criminal justice reform); Gottschalk, supra note 16, at 165–
69 (criticizing reformers’ focus on those who have committed “nonviolent, nonserious, and 
nonsexual” crimes).
49. See, e.g., Buchhandler-Raphael, supra note 44, at 294–95; Floyd, supra note 45, at 
203; Stuart P. Green, Vice Crimes and Preventive Justice, 9 Crim. L. & Phil. 561, 561–62 (2015); 
Susan L. Pilcher, Ignorance, Discretion and the Fairness of Notice: Confronting “Apparent Inno-
cence” in the Criminal Law, 33 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 1, 35 (1995).
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criminally) and she has been overincarcerated (because she does not deserve 
the punishment).50
The mass frame, on the other hand, is less concerned with the culpability
of the individual defendant.51 Instead, this frame is rooted in an inherent 
skepticism about the operation and goals of the criminal system as embed-
ded in a larger model of governance.52 Where the over frame emphasizes 
scope, the mass frame prioritizes structure. The mass critique asks why crim-
inal law has replaced other regulatory models and what the consequences of 
criminal regulation are (e.g., arrest, conviction, and collateral consequences 
of both).53 In this respect, mass accounts are largely phenomenological. This 
line of critique focuses on the ways in which the criminal system marginaliz-
es not only individual defendants, but also communities that bear the brunt 
of criminalization.54 The mass frame would also lead to a critique of the 
nonviolent drug offender’s treatment, but it would not rest on the offender’s
lack of culpability.55 Indeed, this frame also can encompass (or invite) cri-
tiques of criminalizing violent conduct.56 That is, this critical tendency trans-
cends a focus on “nonviolent” offenders or “nonserious” offenses. Generally, 
this frame stresses the ways in which the criminal system contributes to, and 
50. See Stuart P. Green, Why It’s a Crime to Tear the Tag Off a Mattress: Overcriminali-
zation and the Moral Content of Regulatory Offenses, 46 Emory L.J. 1533, 1536 (1997).
51. See, e.g., David Garland, Introduction: The Meaning of Mass Imprisonment, in Mass
Imprisonment: Social Causes and Consequences 1, 2 (David Garland ed., 2001); Traum, 
supra note 31, at 427.
52. See, e.g., Alexander, supra note 5, at 4 (“I came to see that mass incarceration in the 
United States had, in fact, emerged as a stunningly comprehensive and well-disguised system 
of racialized social control that functions in a manner strikingly similar to Jim Crow.”); Marsha 
Weissman, Aspiring to the Impracticable: Alternatives to Incarceration in the Era of Mass Incar-
ceration, 33 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 235, 237 (2009) (“Mass incarceration is a symptom 
of grave structural problems in the United States. . . . The reliance on incarceration for social 
control is . . . due to . . . larger socio-economic issues and structural racism that have marginal-
ized a large percentage of the U.S. population.”).
53. See, e.g., Kaaryn Gustafson, The Criminalization of Poverty, 99 J. Crim. L. & Crimi-
nology 643, 716 (2009); Eisha Jain, Arrests as Regulation, 67 Stan. L. Rev. 809 (2015).
54. See, e.g., Jonathan Simon, Wechsler’s Century and Ours: Reforming Criminal Law in 
a Time of Shifting Rationalities of Government, 7 Buff. Crim. L. Rev. 247, 265 (2003) (“Mass 
imprisonment abandons the individual as a target of penal power in favor of dangerous classes. 
The careful calibration of the social interest in sanctioning certain behaviors is replaced by a 
zero tolerance model in which those designated as dangerous are subjected to long-term con-
tainment on the model of waste management. Imprisonment remains a plausible if unpredict-
able strategy to deal with serious crime, but mass imprisonment promotes something different, 
the indiscriminate use of imprisonment as a response to even modest levels of criminality 
when they are associated with feared or despised groups.”).
55. See, e.g., Forman, Locking Up Our Own, supra note 48, at 221–22.
56. See, e.g., id.; Ristroph, supra note 47, at 621 (“The criminal law is a necessary feature 
of any society of vulnerable embodied persons. We must punish violence. Or so it seems, until 
we discover that we are not always sure what counts as violence, and the criminal law doesn’t
always punish what seems to be violence, and in fact, the greatest source of violence might be 
the criminal law itself.” (emphasis omitted)).
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is a part of, greater structural inequalities in society.57 In this respect, the 
mass frame is less a critique of the criminal system as such than it is a cri-
tique of legal, social, economic, and racial injustice that uses the criminal sys-
tem as an example or a point of entry.58
Ultimately, then, the mass frame is more (or at least more explicitly) an 
ideological critique. In contrast, the over frame is more ideologically inde-
terminate—the fiscal conservative, the libertarian, and the liberal/progressive 
egalitarian all might adopt it. The project of recalibrating or “right sizing”
might (and does) bring together groups whose normative commitments and 
vision of the optimal rate of criminalization or incarceration vary. In con-
trast, the mass frame—at least in its strong form—is rooted in a particular 
(left) ideological critique of neoliberalism, capitalism, and structures of gov-
ernance. Of course, there are different flavors of “left,” and mass critiques 
and critics have different political valences and endorse different policy solu-
tions. Some critics adopting a mass frame might embrace what Allegra 
McLeod describes as a “prison abolitionist ethic,”59 while others might hold 
less radical views and be more open to prisons, police, and prosecutors who 
served different sociopolitical ends or who were directly responsible to mar-
ginalized communities. Regardless, these critiques seem to retain a certain 
affinity (broadly defined) and a certain commitment to a more radical 
reimagining of the state and the criminal system.60
This Part has offered only a rough sketch of two complicated, nuanced 
visions of the criminal system’s flaws. In doing this, I am not suggesting that 
either frame is monolithic. At times, in this Part and in this Article, the 
strong form of either frame may appear unfamiliar or extreme, but—to be 
57. See Alexander, supra note 5, at 185 (describing mass incarceration as a “set of 
structural arrangements that locks a racially distinct group into a subordinate political, social, 
and economic position”); López, supra note 7, at 1028.
58. See, e.g., Emily Hughes, Investigating Gideon’s Legacy in the U.S. Courts of Appeals,
122 Yale L.J. 2376, 2386 (2013) (conceptualizing “mass incarceration as a social justice or civil 
rights issue and not simply a criminal justice issue”).
59. Allegra M. McLeod, Prison Abolition and Grounded Justice, 62 UCLA L. Rev. 1156, 
1156 (2015); see also Amna A. Akbar, Toward a Radical Imagination of Law, 93 N.Y.U. L. 
Rev. 405 (2018); Dorothy E. Roberts, Democratizing Criminal Law As an Abolitionist Project,
111 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1597, 1604–05 (2017) (“My criminal law scholarship has not claimed that 
criminalizing pregnant black women, loitering laws, order-maintenance policing, mass incar-
ceration, capital punishment, and police terror enforce a democratic system in a discriminato-
ry manner. Rather, I have argued that these institutions enforce an undemocratic racial caste 
system originating in slavery. Making criminal law democratic, then, requires something far 
more radical than reducing bias or increasing inclusion in this anti-democratic system. De-
mocratizing criminal law requires dismantling its anti-democratic aspects altogether and re-
constituting the criminal justice system without them. I therefore have joined calls for an aboli-
tionist approach.”).
60. Because of its phenomenological orientation, the mass frame encompasses not only 
normative critiques of prison and the carceral state, but also descriptive and theoretical work in 
a range of disciplines from history to political science and criminology. See generally Levin, 
supra note 23 (describing the shifting and overlapping terms of interdisciplinary “criminal jus-
tice” scholarship).
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clear—I am not suggesting that each author or article cited would endorse 
that strong form. Nor am I suggesting that a given author or article adopts 
only one approach. Instead, my hope is to use this strong form of the typolo-
gy to map the prevailing critiques of the criminal system and to emphasize 
the ways in which very different legal, political, and institutional reforms 
might flow from different frames. In the next two Parts, I explain the two 
frames using as examples the lively scholarly debates about mass incarcera-
tion and overcriminalization.
II. Incarceration
While the first law journal article to use the term “mass incarceration”
appeared in 1938,61 the use of the phrase to denote a distinct phenomenon 
did not gain significant traction for over half a century. In the intervening 
decades, the phrase appeared occasionally in passing, mostly in reference to 
the imprisonment of Japanese Americans during World War II.62 Notably, 
“mass incarceration” in these articles appears to reflect the state’s focus on 
using incarceration to target a discrete racial or ethnic group.63 The phrase/
concept crops up—with a similar connotation—in the early 1980s.64 But its 
use appears to take off in the 1990s,65 led by the work of David Garland.66
61. See Joseph N. Ulman, A National Program to Develop Probation and Parole, 29 J. 
Crim. L. & Criminology 517, 524–25 (1938) (“[I]f a prison term is imposed the young crim-
inal goes to a reformatory or a prison in which the mass incarceration of hundreds or even 
thousands of inmates makes almost impossible any effective work of rehabilitation.”).
62. See, e.g., Roger Daniels, American Historians and East Asian Immigrants, 43 Pac. 
Hist. Rev. 449, 465 n.47 (1974); Walter F. Murphy, Civil Liberties and the Japanese American 
Cases: A Study in the Uses of Stare Decisis, 11 W. Pol. Q. 3, 6, 12 (1958); Philip Tajitsu Nash, 
Moving for Redress, 94 Yale L.J. 743, 744, 753 (1985) (reviewing John Tateishi, And Justice 
for All: An Oral History of the Japanese American Detention Camps (1984)); William 
L. Richter, “The Revolver Rules the Day!”: Colonel DeWitt C. Brown and the Freedmen’s Bureau 
in Paris, Texas, 1867–1868, 93 Sw. Hist. Q. 303 (1990).
63. See, e.g., Roger Daniels, The Japanese American Cases, 1942–2004: A Social History,
68 Law & Contemp. Probs. 159, 163–64 (2005); Nash, supra note 62, at 753.
64. See, e.g., Francis Cullen & John Wozniak, Fighting the Appeal of Repression, 18 
Crime & Soc. Just. 23, 23 (1982) (“It is not too much to assert that Americans have long felt 
comfortable with the notion that the best solution to the crime problem is to put criminals in 
jail. While our role in founding the modern penitentiary is often overstated, it is nevertheless 
true that we were the first people to embrace the practice of mass incarceration and to proselyt-
ize others to the merits of this crime control strategy.”); Richard L. Rubenstein, Moral Outrage 
as False Consciousness, 9 Theory & Soc’y 745, 746 (1980) (arguing that “institutions of mass 
incarceration and enslavement” helped define twentieth century politics); Peter H. Schuck, The 
Transformation of Immigration Law, 84 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 41 (1984) (“[M]ass asylum claims 
have encouraged the INS to adopt an explicit policy of mass incarceration of undocumented 
aliens . . . .”).
65. See, e.g., David Cole, No Equal Justice: Race and Class in the American 
Criminal Justice System (1999); Tracey L. Meares & Dan M. Kahan, Law and (Norms of) 
Order in the Inner City, 32 Law & Soc’y Rev. 805, 813 (1998); Louis Michael Seidman, Akhil 
Amar and the (Premature?) Demise of Criminal Procedure Liberalism, 107 Yale L.J. 2281, 2323 
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Twenty years, later, “mass incarceration” has become a commonplace 
phrase (or concept)67 used by academics,68 judges,69 and politicians alike.70
The following chart constructed from Google Ngram data reflects the spike 
in use of “mass incarceration” and “mass imprisonment” during the 1990s 
and 2000s.71
(1998) (reviewing Akhil Reed Amar, The Constitution and Criminal Procedure: First 
Principles (1997)).
66. See David Garland, The Limits of the Sovereign State: Strategies of Crime Control in 
Contemporary Society, 36 Brit. J. Criminology 445, 461 (1996) (“In a society which mani-
fests deep social and racial divisions, which experiences high crime rates and levels of insecuri-
ty, where welfare solutions have been politically discredited, and in which a developing com-
mercial sector encourages and facilitates the expansion of imprisonment—in other words in 
societies such as the USA or the UK—a punitive political and legal culture soon gives rise to 
mass incarceration, with all of its social and financial consequences.”).
67. As this Part—and this Article, generally—suggests, it is not clear that the phrase al-
ways has a clear theoretical content. Or, to the extent that it does, it is not clear that “mass in-
carceration” is a single concept or phenomenon, rather than a catchall for a range of critiques
or pathologies.
68. See, e.g., Vincent Chiao, Mass Incarceration and the Theory of Punishment, 11 Crim. 
L. & Phil. 431 (2017); David Cole, Turning the Corner on Mass Incarceration?, 9 Ohio St. J. 
Crim. L. 27 (2011); Bernard E. Harcourt, Reducing Mass Incarceration: Lessons from the Dein-
stitutionalization of Mental Hospitals in the 1960s, 9 Ohio St. J. Crim. L. 53 (2011); Mona 
Lynch, Mass Incarceration, Legal Change, and Locale, 10 Criminology & Pub. Pol’y 673
(2011); Alexander Shalom, Bail Reform as a Mass Incarceration Reduction Technique, 66 Rut-
gers L. Rev. 921 (2014); Jonathan Simon, Consuming Obsessions: Housing, Homicide, and 
Mass Incarceration Since 1950, 2010 U. Chi. Legal F. 165; Michael Tonry, Remodeling Amer-
ican Sentencing: A Ten-Step Blueprint for Moving Past Mass Incarceration, 13 Criminology & 
Pub. Pol’y 503 (2014).
69. See, e.g., United States v. Anglin, 846 F.3d 954, 967 (7th Cir. 2017) (“Citing Professor 
Alexander’s seminal work on mass incarceration, the judge assured Anglin that he ‘does not
approach sentencing blindly or without due regard for the consequences of substantial incar-
ceration, particularly in a case like this with a young man age 25.’ ”); United States v. Valdovi-
nos, 760 F.3d 322, 339 (4th Cir. 2014) (Davis, J., dissenting); United States v. Black, 750 F.3d 
1053, 1057 (9th Cir. 2014) (Reinhardt, J., dissenting) (“In this era of mass incarceration, in 
which we already lock up more of our population than any other nation on Earth, it is especial-
ly curious that the government feels compelled to invent fake crimes and imprison people for 
long periods of time . . . .”); United States v. Young, 960 F. Supp. 2d 881, 903 (N.D. Iowa 2013) 
(describing “our Nation’s mass incarceration problems”); United States v. Bannister, 786 F. 
Supp. 2d 617, 649–51 (E.D.N.Y. 2011); United States v. Haynes, 557 F. Supp. 2d 200, 202–03
(D. Mass. 2008).
70. See, e.g., Conyers, supra note 45; Obama, supra note 2; Juleyka Lantigua-Williams, 
Cory Booker Takes Justice Reform Personally, Atlantic (May 22, 2016), https://www.the
atlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/05/what-cory-booker-criminal-reform/483794/ [https://
perma.cc/83KW-AEXX]; Leahy: Congress Must Address the Nation’s Exploding Prison Popula-
tion This Year, Patrick Leahy (July 22, 2015), https://www.leahy.senate.gov/press/leahy-
congress-must-address-the-nations-exploding-prison-population-this-year [https://perma.cc/
HQA2-GUSD].
71. Google Ngram of “Mass Incarceration,” “Mass Imprisonment,” “Over Incarcera-
tion,” and “Over Imprisonment,” Google Books Ngram Viewer, http://bit.ly/2t2qSXJ
[https://perma.cc/8VKE-NTRJ].
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Of course, this chart hardly paints a complete picture.72 The data only runs 
through 2008, so it fails to capture the Obama years and the spike in criminal 
justice reform literature following the release of The New Jim Crow.73 And, 
critically, it includes books, rather than law review articles. But it does help 
illustrate just how important the “mass incarceration” critique is. But what is 
that critique?74 This Part argues that there is both an over and a mass itera-
tion of the mass incarceration critique, and that these two critiques have very 
different focal points, suggesting very different possible solutions. 
A. Mass Incarceration
As noted above, the early uses of the phrase to characterize Japanese in-
carceration appear to reflect a mass frame—the focus is the social function of 
imprisonment, more so than the sheer number of Japanese Americans who 
suffered. But Garland—in what might be the clearest and most cited defini-
tion of the phenomenon75—offers a precise statement of the mass frame:
What are the defining features of mass imprisonment? There are, I think, 
two that are essential. One is sheer numbers. Mass imprisonment implies a 
rate of imprisonment and a size of prison population that is markedly 
72. While the Google Ngram viewer remains a helpful way of tracking usage across 
time, its limitations are well-documented. See, e.g., Eitan Adam Pechenick et al., Characterizing 
the Google Books Corpus: Strong Limits to Inferences of Socio-Cultural and Linguistic Evolution,
10 PLoS ONE: e0137041 (2015), https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0137041 [https://
perma.cc/6UY4-GDKG]; Sarah Zhang, The Pitfalls of Using Google Ngram to Study Language,
Wired (Oct. 12, 2015, 7:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/2015/10/pitfalls-of-studying-
language-with-google-ngram/ [https://perma.cc/869E-9VNJ].
73. A Westlaw search indicates that The New Jim Crow has been cited by 973 law review
articles since its publication. (Search conducted on August 23, 2018 using search term: “The 
New Jim Crow: Mass Incarceration in the Age of Colorblindness”).
74. Cf. Robert Weisberg, Reality-Challenged Philosophies of Punishment, 95 Marq. L. 
Rev. 1203, 1203–04 (2012) (“Over the past decade, the humanities and social sciences have 
yielded substantial literature examining the rise of mass incarceration from various perspec-
tives, ranging from econometric analyses of contributory factors to cultural critiques of Ameri-
can exceptionalism in penal policy.”).
75. See Forman, Racial Critiques, supra note 7, at 23 n.6. (“David Garland is credited 
with coining ‘mass imprisonment . . . .’ ” (quoting Garland, supra note 51, at 1–2)).
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above the historical and comparative norm for societies of this type. The 
US prison system clearly meets these criteria. The other feature is the social 
concentration of imprisonment’s effects. Imprisonment becomes mass im-
prisonment when it ceases to be the incarceration of individual offenders 
and becomes the systematic imprisonment of whole groups of the popula-
tion. In the case of the USA, the group concerned is, of course, young black 
males in large urban centres. For these sections of the population, impris-
onment has become normalized. It has come to be a regular, predictable 
part of experience, rather than a rare and infrequent event.76
This two-part definition first provides a quantitative statement that—taken 
alone—might serve as the basis for the over frame. But, critically, Garland 
pairs that concern (i.e., too many people in prison) with a deeper critique of 
incarceration’s social function.
From a mass perspective, perhaps the most important word in Garland’s
definition in “systemic.” That is, the critique is not about one-off interac-
tions between individuals and the legal system; rather, the phenomenon is a 
phenomenon because of its structural or systemic dimensions.77 The quanti-
tative critique or element is a means of understanding the larger structural 
point—that the criminal system is a form of social control that creates and 
exacerbates societal inequalities. It is this element of Garland’s definition 
that helps explain the mass definition and how it differs from a purely quan-
titative account of mass incarceration. 
Critiques applying a mass frame (and even those critical and agnostic 
about it) tend to characterize mass incarceration much like Garland does.78
Such critiques have stressed that punishment and marginalization operate 
collectively, rather than simply on an individual basis.79 Jonathan Simon has 
described mass incarceration as a set of structures that imposes “systemic in-
humanity and racialized violence.”80 Similarly, in The New Jim Crow,
76. Garland, supra note 51, at 5–6. While Garland uses the phrase “mass imprison-
ment,” “[t]he terms ‘mass incarceration’ and ‘mass imprisonment’ are used synonymously in 
the criminal justice literature.” Forman, Racial Critiques, supra note 7, at 23 n.6.
77. See also Simon, supra note 54, at 256–58. But see United States v. Tarango, No. CR 
07–2443, 2015 WL 10401775, at *22 (D.N.M. Oct. 29, 2015) (“While many criticize the federal 
courts for ‘mass incarceration,’ surely this phrase is a hyperbole, or at least a poor shorthand 
for the problem being addressed; there is no ‘mass incarceration’—each defendant was sepa-
rately convicted and sentenced, one at a time.”).
78. See Nicole P. Dyszlewski et al., Mass Incarceration: An Annotated Bibliography, 21 
Roger Williams U. L. Rev. 471, 476–77 (2016) (“Among mass incarceration scholars, Da-
vid Garland is the father of mass incarceration.”).
79. See, e.g., Traum, supra note 31, at 427 (identifying mass incarceration as “a group 
and systemic problem, not merely an individual problem”); Bruce Western & Christopher 
Muller, Mass Incarceration, Macrosociology, and the Poor, 647 Annals Am. Acad. Pol. & Soc. 
Sci. 166, 168 (2013) (“[I]ncarceration must be so extensive and concentrated that it imprisons 
not just the individual but the group.”).
80. Jonathan Simon, Amnesty Now! Ending Prison Overcrowding Through a Categorical 
Use of the Pardon Power, 70 U. Miami L. Rev. 444, 475 (2016); see also Jonathan Simon, The 
Return of the Medical Model: Disease and the Meaning of Imprisonment from John Howard to 
Brown v. Plata, 48 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 217, 220 (2013).
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Michelle Alexander argues that mass incarceration has operated as a “stun-
ningly comprehensive and well-disguised system of racialized social con-
trol.”81
Much as Garland’s definition is essential to understanding the mass cri-
tique, so too is The New Jim Crow (and the critical response to it). The New 
Jim Crow delivers a searing critique of the criminal system as a model of 
marginalizing and subjugating people of color, particularly black men.82 And 
the book helped herald a growing public awareness of the criminal system’s
flaws.83 As James Forman, Jr. puts it, Alexander’s book “played a crucial role 
in providing advocates with a framework for understanding, and a rhetoric 
for criticizing, the War on Drugs. Published in 2010, the book quickly be-
came required reading for anyone concerned about mass incarceration.”84
Forman recounts how the D.C. City Council’s 2014 decision to decriminalize 
marijuana possession rested—at least in part—on the resonance of the book: 
“various witnesses [at hearings] cit[ed] The New Jim Crow and one city 
council member explain[ed] that the book had ‘compelled me to be heavily 
engaged in this conversation.’ ”85
In this respect, The New Jim Crow operates as one of the most recog-
nizable critiques of mass incarceration. But that doesn’t mean that its ap-
proach or arguments have been embraced by other academic critics of mass 
incarceration. Scholars have leveled a number of criticisms at The New Jim 
Crow86: the book overstates the role of the War on Drugs and understates the 
role of violent crime;87 the book overemphasizes the federal system when, in 
81. Alexander, supra note 5, at 4; see also Kimberlé W. Crenshaw, From Private Vio-
lence to Mass Incarceration: Thinking Intersectionally About Women, Race, and Social Control,
59 UCLA L. Rev. 1418, 1446 (2012) (“[T]he current crisis that we call mass incarceration or 
punishment comprises multiple intersections—not just of identity and power but of systemic 
dynamics that themselves do the work of subordination.”).
82. See generally Alexander, supra note 5.
83. See, e.g., Gottschalk, supra note 16, at 3 (“[T]he contributions of Alexander’s The 
New Jim Crow cannot be underestimated. No other book has been so vital in making the prob-
lem of the carceral state starkly visible to the wider public and in rallying members of disad-
vantaged communities and other groups to take on the project of dismantling it.”); Richard
Delgado & Jean Stefancic, Critical Perspectives on Police, Policing, and Mass Incarceration, 104
Geo. L.J. 1531, 1534–37 (2016) (describing the book as “a modern classic” and observing that 
“The New Jim Crow makes a notable contribution to public discourse, shedding light on how 
society became trapped in the current web of overzealous punishment and then pointing the 
way out”).
84. Forman, Locking Up Our Own, supra note 48, at 220.
85. Id. (quoting Public Hearing Before the Comm. on the Judiciary and Public Safety on 
the Simple Possession of Small Quantities of Marijuana Decriminalization Amendment Act of 
2013, D.C. Council 3, 50 (Oct. 24, 2013) (statement of David Grosso, Council Member)).
86. This list is not meant to be exhaustive. See generally Jonathan Wood, Note, The Old 
Boss the Same as the New Boss?: Critiques and Plaudits of Michelle Alexander’s New Jim Crow 
Metaphor, 7 Geo. J.L. & Mod. Critical Race Persp. 175 (2015) (collecting critiques).
87. See, e.g., Gottschalk, supra note 16, at 126–30; Pfaff, supra note 20, at 5–6, 21; 
Forman, Racial Critiques, supra note 7, at 23; Benjamin Levin, Guns and Drugs, 84 Fordham 
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fact, states incarcerate vastly more individuals than the federal government;88
the book paints race in the United States as black and white, understating the 
criminal system’s impact on Latinos and other racial and ethnic groups;89 the 
book focuses on the role of white conservatives and understates the role of 
liberals and black lawyers, lawmakers, and activists in constructing the appa-
ratus of mass incarceration;90 and the book stretches the historical analogy to 
Jim Crow.91 These critiques certainly have some merit and add important 
and much-needed nuance to the discussion of the criminal system’s flaws. 
But some of the critiques of The New Jim Crow appear to be rooted less in 
any problem with Alexander’s arguments than in a difference of frame or 
perhaps even a fundamental disagreement as to what mass incarceration is.
Granted, some scholars’ criticisms operate as internal critiques—mass
concerns that Alexander might have overstated, understated, or missed. But 
from an over perspective, the critique is essentially empirical; for example, 
the laws that Alexander blames (primarily drug crimes) actually account for 
a comparatively small portion of all prosecutions, arrests, and convictions.92
Instead, jails and prisons are filled disproportionately with people who have 
committed violent crimes.93
This critique serves as the backbone for John Pfaff’s well-received book 
Locked In: The True Causes of Mass Incarceration—And How to Achieve Real 
Reform.94 To Pfaff, The New Jim Crow has helped popularize a flawed 
“standard story” of mass incarceration.95 The standard story is misleading, 
according to Pfaff, as it presents the War on Drugs as the true enemy and 
convinces reformers and scholars that rethinking drug prohibition would 
reverse or end mass incarceration.96
This critique of the drug-centric narrative is right as far as it goes. To the 
extent that The New Jim Crow’s contribution is the argument that drug ar-
rests and prosecutions directly caused the spike in U.S. prison populations, 
L. Rev. 2173, 2194 (2016); Anders Walker, The New Jim Crow? Recovering the Progressive Ori-
gins of Mass Incarceration, 41 Hastings Const. L.Q. 845, 846 (2014).
88. See generally Pfaff, supra note 20; German Lopez, Why You Can’t Blame Mass In-
carceration on the War on Drugs, Vox (May 30, 2017, 9:00 AM), https://www.vox.com/policy-
and-politics/2017/5/30/15591700/mass-incarceration-john-pfaff-locked-in [https://perma.cc/
C4NV-8GP3].
89. See, e.g., Forman, Racial Critiques, supra note 7, at 60.
90. See, e.g., Forman, Locking Up Our Own, supra note 48; Michael Javen Fort-
ner, Black Silent Majority: The Rockefeller Drug Laws and the Politics of 
Punishment (2015); Naomi Murakawa, The First Civil Right: How Liberals Built 
Prison America (2014); Forman, Racial Critiques, supra note 7, at 23.
91. See, e.g., Forman, Racial Critiques, supra note 7, at 23; Walker, supra note 87, at 
848–55.
92. See, e.g., Pfaff, supra note 20, at 5–6, 21.
93. See id.
94. See generally id. at 21–51.
95. See id. at 5.
96. See generally id. at 21–51.
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then Pfaff (and others) are spot on and have done an important service by 
offering such a corrective.97 Reading The New Jim Crow through an over
frame renders some of its core claims contestable at best and dramatically 
reduces its effect. But, despite its importance, Pfaff’s critique assumes only 
one mode of critique—an over mode. Mass critiques of the book identify 
other issues but recognize that Alexander’s critique is about more than arrest 
numbers; it also operates as a mass account of the criminal system.98
In other words, we might read the book as more of a sociological or cul-
tural claim—the War on Drugs (as a component of the broader War on 
Crime) served to marginalize generations of people of color, particularly 
young black men. This marginalization occurs via formal legal structures—
collateral consequences in the labor market, in housing, and in voting 
rights99—and also via social and legal estrangement.100 So, the impact of the 
War on Drugs transcends any data that we could track using the Bureau of 
Justice Statistics. Insofar as the criminal system serves a function of social 
control, of public education, and of constructing social meaning,101 the War 
on Drugs and aggressive policing of poor people of color sends a critical 
message—a message of second-class citizenship and othering.102 Borrowing 
Garland’s formulation, “[P]enal exclusion has been layered on top of eco-
nomic and racial exclusion, . . . ensuring that social divisions are deep-
97. I will return to Pfaff’s account (and definition) of mass incarceration infra in Section 
II.B.
98. In a sense, The New Jim Crow demonstrates how mass and over approaches can co-
exist in the same work. The book rests on both an empirical claim and a cultural claim. See Al-
exander, supra note 5, at 16–19.
99. See id. at 143, 158, 187, 193. Cf. Pager, supra note 1, at 28–41; Western, supra note
1, at 6 (describing the process of “social exclusion”).
100. Cf. Monica C. Bell, Police Reform and the Dismantling of Legal Estrangement, 126 
Yale L.J. 2054, 2083 (2017) (describing the social construction of “legal estrangement”).
101. See, e.g., Emile Durkheim, The Division of Labor in Society 102 (W.D. Halls 
trans., 1984) (1893); Michel Foucault, Discipline & Punish: The Birth of the Pris-
on 138 (Alan Sheridan trans., 2d ed. 1995); Benjamin Levin, Inmates for Rent, Sovereignty for 
Sale: The Global Prison Market, 23 S. Cal. Interdisc. L.J. 509, 554 n.90 (2014); cf. Raymond 
Geuss, The Idea of a Critical Theory: Habermas and the Frankfurt School 59 
(1981) (“To say that the members of the society take a basic social institution to be ‘legitimate’
is to say that they take it to ‘follow’ from a system of norms they all accept[,] . . . a set of general 
beliefs (normative beliefs and other kinds of beliefs) which are organized into a world-picture 
which they assume all members of the society hold. So a social institution is considered legiti-
mate if it can be shown to stand in the right relation to the basic world-picture of the group.”); 
Duncan Kennedy, The Stakes of Law, or Hale and Foucault!, 15 Legal Stud. F. 327, 347 (1991) 
(“[T]he legal system creates as well as reflects consensus (this is true both of legislation and of 
adjudication). Its institutional mechanism ‘legitimates,’ in the sense of exercising normative 
force on the citizenry.”).
102. See Bell, supra note 100, at 2083.
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ened . . . and that a criminalized underclass is brought into existence and sys-
tematically perpetuated.”103
Viewed through the mass frame, then, mass incarceration comprises a 
system of making and enforcing criminal law, as much as it consists of indi-
vidual case outcomes or numbers of people incarcerated.104 Paul Butler de-
scribes “[m]ass incarceration’s process of control” as “the social and legal 
apparatus by which poor people [and black people] become losers in crimi-
nal justice.”105 Butler identifies “five steps” that make up the process of ex-
clusion:
(1) The spaces that poor people, especially poor African Americans, live in 
receive more law enforcement in the form of police stops and arrests.
(2) The criminal law deliberately ignores the social conditions that breed 
some forms of law-breaking. Deprivations associated with poverty are 
usually not “defenses” to criminal liability, although they may be factors 
considered in sentencing.
(3) African Americans, who are disproportionately poor, are the target of 
explicit and implicit bias by key actors in the criminal justice system, in-
cluding police, prosecutors, and judges.
(4) Once any person is arrested, she becomes part of a crime control system 
of criminal justice, in which guilt is presumed. Prosecutors, using the le-
gal apparatus of expansive criminal liability, recidivist statutes, and 
mandatory minimums, coerce guilty pleas by threatening defendants 
with vastly disproportionate punishment if they go to trial.
(5) Repeat the cycle. A criminal caste is created. Two-thirds of freed prison-
ers are rearrested, and half return to prison, within three years of their 
release.106
Butler’s account does not foreground guilt or innocence. Rather, his descrip-
tion is a structural critique of how institutions operate to strip power and 
agency from the already-marginalized. The system fails not because it mis-
takes the innocent for the guilty, but because it creates a “criminal caste.”107
As Butler’s critique illustrates, the mass frame suggests that mass incar-
ceration is not just about incarceration as such. Instead, it is a critique of a 
mode or method of doing criminal law—of lawmaking, of enforcement, and 
of regulating court-involved individuals. Mass incarceration encompasses 
modes of policing, interactions between civilians and criminal justice offi-
cials, and a host of causes, effects, and features of the carceral state. For ex-
103. Garland, supra note 51, at 2; see also Jonathan Simon & Richard Sparks, Punishment 
and Society: The Emergence of an Academic Field, in The Sage Handbook of Punishment 
and Society 1, 11 (Jonathan Simon & Richard Sparks eds., 2013).
104. See generally Dean Spade, Normal Life: Administrative Violence, Criti-
cal Trans Politics, and the Limits of Law 11 (2d ed. 2015).
105. Butler, supra note 21, at 2183.
106. Id. at 2183–85 (footnotes omitted).
107. See id.
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ample, Jack Chin has argued that the term “mass incarceration” “obscures 
the reality” of the criminal system.108 According to Chin, “mass conviction”
would make a more appropriate label—it is not incarceration that does 
much of the harm to court-involved individuals; instead, conviction (even if 
unaccompanied by incarceration) triggers a vast web of collateral conse-
quences and a social status akin to “civil death.”109 Indeed, mass conviction 
still would be underinclusive or would fail to capture the breadth of the 
criminal system. Arrest or simply contact with police officers can be enough 
to catapult an individual into the Kafkaesque realm of collateral conse-
quence, fines, and fees.110 That realm, that web of laws, of social structures, 
and of formal and informal consequences comprises the target of critique.111
Taking the broadest or strongest form of the critique, then, leads us to a 
deeper critique of the state and broader structures of governance.112 Marie 
Gottschalk describes the U.S. structures of governmentality as “the carceral 
state.”113 Likewise, Bernard Harcourt describes the post-1970 approach to 
108. Gabriel J. Chin, The New Civil Death: Rethinking Punishment in the Era of Mass 
Conviction, 160 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1789, 1804 (2012).
109. Id. at 1803–06; see also Issa Kohler-Hausmann, Managerial Justice and Mass Misde-
meanors, 66 Stan. L. Rev. 611, 612 n.2, 693 (2014) (“The era of mass incarceration might 
more accurately be called the era of mass conviction and correctional supervision, as parole 
and probation populations have grown at an even faster rate than the incarcerated popula-
tion.”).
110. See, e.g., Delgado & Stefancic, supra note 83, at 1537; Rachel A. Harmon, Why Ar-
rest?, 115 Mich. L. Rev. 307, 314 (2016); Aziz Z. Huq, The Consequences of Disparate Policing: 
Evaluating Stop and Frisk as a Modality of Urban Policing, 101 Minn. L. Rev. 2397, 2431 
(2017); Jain, supra note 53; Alexandra Natapoff, Misdemeanor Decriminalization, 68 Vand. L. 
Rev. 1055, 1079–81 (2015) [hereinafter Natapoff, Misdemeanor Decriminalization]; Alexandra 
Natapoff, Misdemeanors, 11 Ann. Rev. L. & Soc. Sci. 255, 258 (2015).
111. See, e.g., Tamar R. Birckhead & Katie Rose Guest Pryal, Symposium 2014: Vulnerable 
Defendants in the Criminal Justice System; Introduction, 93 N.C. L. Rev. 1211, 1221 (2015) 
(“Whether it is solitary confinement, the prosecution of minors for prostitution, racial profil-
ing, criminalizing the mentally ill, or sexually abusing children in custody, the common de-
nominator is that these practices are all by-products of the systemic problems that continue to 
plague our criminal justice system.”); Dorothy E. Roberts, Privatization and Punishment in the 
New Age of Reprogenetics, 54 Emory L.J. 1343, 1350–51 (2005) (“Mounting social science 
studies on the community-level impact of mass incarceration reveal that prison has become a 
systemic aspect of community members’ family affairs, economic prospects, political engage-
ment, social norms, and childhood expectations for the future.”).
112. See Akbar, supra note 59, at 110 (describing radical interventions as “expand[ing] 
the frame for police violence beyond criminal process, to the interlocking systems that propel 
and draw from anti-Black racism”).
113. See generally Gottschalk, supra note 16; Marie Gottschalk, Dismantling the Car-
ceral State: The Future of Penal Policy Reform, 84 Tex. L. Rev. 1693, 1693 (2006) (“Three fea-
tures distinguish the U.S. carceral state: the sheer size of its prison and jail population; its reli-
ance on harsh, degrading sanctions; and the persistence and centrality of the death penalty.”); 
cf. Michael Meranze, Pathology of the Carceral State, L.A. Rev. Books (Feb. 4, 2015) (re-
viewing Gottschalk, supra note 16), https://lareviewofbooks.org/article/pathology-
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criminal justice policy as “neoliberal penality”—the state has adopted a “de-
regulatory” or free market approach to the economy but has grown signifi-
cantly as an institution of punishment.114 In this vein, a range of mass cri-
tiques emphasize the ways in which a deterioration of the New Deal or Great 
Society welfare state has led to a new vision of governance in which the gov-
ernment replaces provision of benefits with provision of punishment and 
where the model of addressing poverty and social problems is via the crimi-
nal system.115 Sharon Dolovich and Alexandra Natapoff argue that “[e]ven as 
our welfare institutions route the disadvantaged into the criminal system, the 
criminal process itself functions as a powerful engine of social inequality.”116
Likewise, Aya Gruber contends that “[t]he tough-on-crime philosophy that 
overtook America was not a singular phenomenon, divorced from a larger 
political and economic program, but a distinct part of a neoliberal paradigm 
of rampant individualism, minimization of government services, and uncon-
strained capitalism.”117 That is, mass incarceration reflects a political system 
in which the state is “governing through crime.”118
carceral-state/ [https://perma.cc/55RF-693T] (tying Gottschalk’s characterization and critique 
of the carceral state to Michel Foucault’s conception of the “carceral archipelago”).
114. See Bernard E. Harcourt, The Illusion of Free Markets: Punishment 
and the Myth of Natural Order 40–44 (2011) (“Neoliberal penality facilitates passing 
new criminal statutes and wielding the penal sanction more liberally because that is where gov-
ernment is necessary, that is where the state can legitimately act, that is the proper and compe-
tent sphere of politics. By creating and reinforcing this categorical division between a space of 
free self-regulation and an arena where coercion is necessary, appropriate, and effective, ne-
oliberal penality has fertilized the growth of the penal domain.”); Bernard E. Harcourt, On the 
American Paradox of Laissez Faire and Mass Incarceration, 125 Harv. L. Rev. F. 54 (2012); 
see also Aziza Ahmed, Adjudicating Risk: AIDS, Crime, and Culpability, 2016 Wis. L. Rev.
627, 629–30, 630 n.13; Allegra M. McLeod, Regulating Sexual Harm: Strangers, Intimates, and 
Social Institutional Reform, 102 Calif. L. Rev. 1553, 1581 (2014); Frank Pasquale, Grand Bar-
gains for Big Data: The Emerging Law of Health Information, 72 Md. L. Rev. 682, 765 (2013) 
(“As Bernard Harcourt and Loïc Wacquant have shown, neoliberal penality has been a hall-
mark of U.S. politics since the 1970s.”).
115. See, e.g., Ruth Wilson Gilmore, Golden Gulag: Prisons, Surplus, Crisis, 
and Opposition in Globalizing California 85–86 (2007); Nicola Lacey, The Pris-
oners’ Dilemma: Political Economy and Punishment in Contemporary Democ-
racies 170–73 (2008); Loïc Wacquant, Punishing the Poor: The Neoliberal Gov-
ernment of Social Insecurity 1–3 (2009); Angelina Snodgrass Godoy, Converging on the 
Poles: Contemporary Punishment and Democracy in Hemispheric Perspective, 30 Law & Soc. 
Inquiry 515, 517 (2005); Aya Gruber, Murder, Minority Victims, and Mercy, 85 U. Colo. L. 
Rev. 129, 171 (2014); Aya Gruber, A Provocative Defense, 103 Calif. L. Rev. 273, 331 (2015); 
Gustafson, supra note 53, at 646 n.12 (“A number of sociologists use the term criminalization 
of poverty to describe an element of neoliberalism that involves the mass incarceration of poor 
people of color.”); McLeod, supra note 37, at 667; Eric J. Miller, Drugs, Courts, and the New 
Penology, 20 Stan. L. & Pol’y Rev. 417, 438 (2009).
116. Dolovich & Natapoff, supra note 34, at 14.
117. Aya Gruber, Rape, Feminism, and the War on Crime, 84 Wash. L. Rev. 581, 618–19
(2009) (footnote omitted).
118. See Jonathan Simon, Governing Through Crime: How the War on Crime 
Transformed American Democracy and Created a Culture of Fear 17 (2007) (“When 
we govern through crime, we make crime and the forms of knowledge historically associated 
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B. Over Incarceration
The over frame shares many similar concerns with the mass frame and 
relies on much of the same data, but the underlying definition of the phe-
nomenon differs, and the breadth of the critique is significantly narrower. In 
the introduction to Locked In, Pfaff observes the challenge in defining mass 
incarceration.119 Pfaff cites to Garland’s definition in an endnote, observing 
that “the second part [of the definition] may do some real work.”120 Never-
theless, Pfaff concludes that “[t]he criticisms over ‘mass incarceration’ essen-
tially boil down to claims that we have too many people in prison . . . and 
that we should reduce that number . . . .”121 Race is a part of Pfaff’s critique 
(and his reading of others’ critiques),122 but generally not in the totalizing 
caste sense that the mass frame indicates.123 Instead, viewed through an over
lens, the issue is whether too many people of color are incarcerated, as com-
pared to either an optimal rate or the rate at which white people are incar-
cerated.124
Pfaff’s book serves as an instructive point of entry into the over frame for 
mass incarceration both because: (1) it provides a compelling version of the 
account; and (2) it expresses skepticism about the over incarceration frame 
and suggested policy solutions.125 To the first point, Pfaff’s account of mass 
incarceration, its causes, and its cures rests almost exclusively on quantitative 
with it—criminal law, popular crime narrative, and criminology—available outside their lim-
ited original subject domains as powerful tools with which to interpret and frame all forms of 
social action as a problem for governance.”).
119. See Pfaff, supra note 20, at 8.
120. Id. at 241 n.13. Pfaff continues that “the first part [i.e., the quantitative portion of the 
definition] provides little guidance about when ‘high’ becomes ‘mass.’ ” Id. (citing David Gar-
land, Introduction: The Meaning of Mass Imprisonment, 3 Punishment & Soc. 5 (2001)).
121. Id. at 8.
122. See, e.g., id. at 44–50, 146–47.
123. But see id. at 49 (“It is also essential to address the structural barriers that limit ac-
cess to the primary job market in the first place—to focus on making sure people have first 
chances before trying to help them get second ones. Yet this is not something that the criminal 
justice system is equipped to do, which points to very real limits on what reforms that focus on 
the criminal justice system by itself can accomplish.” (footnotes omitted)).
124. See id. at 44–49.
125. Pfaff has articulated similar critiques and arguments elsewhere. See, e.g., John F. 
Pfaff, Federal Sentencing in the States: Some Thoughts on Federal Grants and State Imprison-
ment, 66 Hastings L.J. 1567 (2015); John F. Pfaff, The Empirics of Prison Growth: A Critical 
Review and Path Forward, 98 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 547 (2008); John F. Pfaff, The War on 
Drugs and Prison Growth: Limited Importance, Limited Legislative Options, 52 Harv. J. on 
Legis. 173 (2015); John F. Pfaff, The Complicated Economics of Prison Reform, 114 Mich. L. 
Rev. 951 (2016) (reviewing Hadar Aviram, Cheap on Crime: Recession-Era Politics and 
the Transformation of American Punishment (2015), and Gottschalk, supra note 16); 
John F. Pfaff, Waylaid by a Metaphor: A Deeply Problematic Account of Prison Growth, 111 
Mich. L. Rev. 1087 (2013) (reviewing Ernest Drucker, A Plague of Prisons: The Epide-
miology of Mass Incarceration in America (2011)).
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analysis. Trained as an economist (as well as a lawyer), Pfaff provides a data-
driven story of growing prison populations that rejects the primacy of the 
War on Drugs, emphasizes the role of prosecutors, and stresses the im-
portance of states and localities, rather than the federal government.126 In 
this respect, Locked In operates as a direct response to The New Jim Crow—
using the over frame, Pfaff sets out to debunk empirical errors and over-
statements that he views as undermining the “standard story” of mass incar-
ceration.127
While different scholars articulate the over critique differently, as a way 
of understanding mass incarceration, it rests on a concern about too much.128
Taken in its extreme form, we can imagine mass incarceration represented 
by an equation129:
High Rate of Incarceration + 1 = Mass Incarceration
or:
High Prison Population + 1 = Mass Incarceration
The assumption is that there is an optimal (or acceptable) rate of punish-
ment, and at some point, society crosses a line, and we get mass incarcera-
tion. Through this frame, “[t]he problem of mass incarceration is entirely 
produced by the simple mathematics of two pressure points—how many 
people enter prison and how long they stay there.”130 And, by that logic, “[i]f 
the problem of mass incarceration is the large number of people who go into 
prison and how long they stay there, then the solution is for fewer to go in 
and for shorter stays.”131
Mass critiques also may rely on prison, arrest, and conviction data (re-
flecting Garland’s first element).132 But those accounts remain focused on the 
126. See generally Pfaff, supra note 20.
127. See id.
128. See, e.g., Husak, supra note 3, at 4 (identifying the criminal system’s flaws as boiling 
down to “too many crimes” and “too much punishment”); Conyers, supra note 45, at 378 
(“This mass incarceration is overincarceration.” (emphasis omitted)).
129. Cf. Pfaff, supra note 20, at 241 n.13 (expressing frustration about the lack of clarity
as to when “high” incarceration becomes “mass” incarceration).
130. Clear, supra note 41, at 125; see also John J. Donohue III, Economic Models of Crime 
and Punishment, 74 Soc. Res. 379, 384 (2007) (identifying mass incarceration as operating 
through “more frequent and longer impositions of terms of imprisonment as well as through 
the war on drugs”).
131. Clear, supra note 41, at 125–26.
132. See Garland, supra note 51, at 5–6; see also Katherine Beckett & Bruce Western, 
Governing Social Marginality: Welfare, Incarceration, and the Transformation of State Policy, in
Mass Imprisonment: Social Causes and Consequences, supra note 51, at 35–50; Bernard 
E. Harcourt, An Institutionalization Effect: The Impact of Mental Hospitalization and Impris-
onment on Homicide in the United States, 1934–2001, 40 J. Legal Stud. 39, 62 (2011); Rob-
erts, supra note 7, at 1274 (“The first feature of mass incarceration is simply the sheer numbers 
of African Americans behind bars.”).
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social control element—the numbers are an illustration of just how extreme 
the marginalization is.133 Over critiques, on the other hand, tend to focus on 
the data not only as evidence of the problem, but as the problem itself.134
While Pfaff largely adopts the over frame, he also articulates compelling-
ly one of the key challenges with such an approach: the lack of a shared un-
derstanding of the optimal or acceptable rate of punishment.135 “Part of the 
problem,” he explains:
[I]s that no one has provided a metric for determining how many people in 
prison is “too many” (except perhaps prison abolitionists, for whom it is 
any number much greater than zero). Should we rely on some sort of strict 
cost-benefit analysis—and if so, what sorts of costs and benefits should we 
include? Does harm to the inmate count, for example, or harm to the in-
mate’s family? And are there other moral values, such as retributivism or 
mercy, that argue for more or fewer people in prison, independent of any 
effect on crime or safety or budgets?136
For a model that at first appears to offer greater clarity than the mass
frame,137 this question of optimal rates, metrics, and theories of punishment 
quickly complicates matters.
Indeed, surveying over critiques of mass incarceration reveals a range of 
metrics, cost-benefit analyses, and theories of punishment driving the desig-
nation of “mass.” Some scholars and critics do not necessarily identify their 
metric or their theory of socially acceptable incarceration—the current 
amount is too much, and it is greater than the amount earlier in U.S. history, 
but there is no articulated standard for what the rates should be.138 On the 
other hand, some scholars frame mass incarceration as a failure or problem 
because it flies in the face of some other value. For a range of critics, the 
problem is one based on cost and efficiency: the state should be punishing, 
but the current system costs too much, given the limited returns in terms of 
increasing public safety.139 This critique has been a staple of the advocacy 
133. See generally Beckett & Western, supra note 132.
134. See, e.g., Clear, supra note 41, at 125–26; Pfaff, supra note 20, at 8.
135. See Pfaff, supra note 20, at 8.
136. Id.
137. Cf. Western & Muller, supra note 79, at 168 (describing the second part of Garland’s
two-part definition as “more elliptical” than the first part).
138. See, e.g., Rachel E. Barkow & Mark Osler, Restructuring Clemency: The Cost of Ignor-
ing Clemency and a Plan for Renewal, 82 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1 (2015); Roger A. Fairfax, Jr., Essay, 
Searching for Solutions to the Indigent Defense Crisis in the Broader Criminal Justice Reform 
Agenda, 122 Yale L.J. 2316, 2328 (2013); Michael M. O’Hear, Mass Incarceration in Three 
Midwestern States: Origins and Trends, 47 Val. U. L. Rev. 709, 709 (2013); Shalom, supra
note 68, at 923; Taslitz, supra note 7, at 133.
139. See e.g., Cecelia Klingele, The Promises and Perils of Evidence-Based Corrections, 91 
Notre Dame L. Rev. 537, 551 (2015); Wayne A. Logan, Informal Collateral Consequences, 88 
Wash. L. Rev. 1103 (2013) (“Driven by a number of factors, not the least of which is the 
enormous human and financial cost of mass incarceration, policy makers are now shrinking 
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from conservative and libertarian criminal justice reformers.140 But an effi-
ciency-maximizing approach also has gained ground with judges, scholars, 
activists, and politicians with other political commitments.141
Aside from pure economic efficiency, a range of scholars and commen-
tators embrace an over critique relying on a preferred theory of punishment.
If punishment should be designed for optimal deterrence, the critique goes, 
the current rate of punishment is excessive.142 The deterrence could be 
achieved by incarcerating fewer individuals for less time.143 From a retribu-
tive standpoint, the critique sounds in the language of moral desert: an indi-
vidual who commits a crime deserves to be punished, but the current degree 
of punishment is too great and is not morally required.144 Incapacitationist 
prison and jail populations and pursuing cheaper non-brick-and-mortar social control op-
tions.” (footnotes omitted)); Suzanne Valdez, A Policy Paper on What Can Be Done About 
Low-Level, Non-Violent Female Drug Offenders in Kansas, 25 Kan. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 131, 133 
(2015); Marc Levin, Marc Levin Testimony at House Judiciary Committee Overcriminzalization 
Task Force, Right on Crime (May 30, 2014), http://rightoncrime.com/2014/05/marc-levin-
testimony-at-house-judiciary-committee-overcriminalization-task-force/ [perma.cc/MZ7P-
PGRD].
140. See, e.g., Reddy & Levin, supra note 42; Michael Tonry, Making American Sentencing 
Just, Humane, and Effective, 46 Crime & Just. 441, 449 (2017); Newt Gingrich & Pat Nolan, 
Opinion, Prison Reform: A Smart Way for States To Save Money and Lives, Wash. Post (Jan. 
7, 2011), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2011/01/06/AR201101060
4386.html [https://perma.cc/D3V9-YJXB].
141. See, e.g., United States v. Leitch, Nos. 11–CR–00609 (JG), 11–CR–00457 (JG), 11–
CR–00039 (JG), 2013 WL 753445, at *12 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 28, 2013); United States v. Diaz, No.
11–CR–00821–2 (JG), 2013 WL 322243, at *10 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 28, 2013) (“Mass incarceration 
comes at great cost; prison is expensive. The annual cost of housing a prisoner is $21,006 for a 
minimum-security facility; $25,378 for a low-security facility; $26,247 for a medium-security 
facility; and $33,930 for a high-security facility. The President’s Fiscal Year 2013 budget request 
for BOP is over $6.9 billion dollars, an increase of $278 million or 4.2% from the Fiscal Year 
2012 budget. The BOP budget request accounts for about 25% of DOJ’s overall budget request. 
We will spend almost exactly as much on federal prisons alone as we do on the entire federal 
judiciary.” (footnotes omitted)); Mirko Bagaric, From Arbitrariness to Coherency in Sentencing: 
Reducing the Rate of Imprisonment and Crime While Saving Billions of Taxpayer Dollars, 19 
Mich. J. Race & L. 349 (2014); Barkow, supra note 1, at 45; Jessica M. Eaglin, Against Neore-
habilitation, 66 SMU L. Rev. 189, 212 (2013) (“Bipartisan calls for reform in particular em-
phasize evidence that rehabilitation is cheaper than incarceration.”); Fan, supra note 35, at 634; 
Heather Schoenfeld, The War on Drugs, the Politics of Crime, and Mass Incarceration in the 
United States, 15 J. Gender Race & Just. 315, 316 (2012).
142. See, e.g., Mirko Bagaric et al., Bringing Sentencing into the 21st Century: Closing the 
Gap Between Practice and Knowledge by Introducing Expertise into Sentencing Law, 45 Hof-
stra L. Rev. 785, 789 (2017).
143. See Robert Weisberg, Empirical Criminal Law Scholarship and the Shift to Institu-
tions, 65 Stan. L. Rev. 1371, 1378 (2013).
144. See, e.g., Mirko Bagaric & Sandeep Gopalan, Saving the United States from Lurching 
to Another Sentencing Crisis: Taking Proportionality Seriously and Implementing Fair Fixed 
Penalties, 60 St. Louis U. L.J. 169, 190 (2016); Joshua Kleinfeld, Two Cultures of Punishment,
68 Stan. L. Rev. 933, 1036 (2016); Mark Osler & Mark W. Bennett, A “Holocaust in Slow Mo-
tion?” America’s Mass Incarceration and the Role of Discretion, 7 DePaul J. for Soc. Just.
117, 157 (2014) (“[T]here are too many people, especially people of color, in too many prisons, 
288 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 117:259
critics focused on public safety note that the current system does a bad job 
sorting out the truly dangerous defendant from the one who might pose less 
of a social threat.145 As a result (similarly to the efficiency critique), the state 
is incarcerating people who do not (or cease to) pose a danger to society.146
Finally, some over accounts take up the expressive or democratic-legitimacy-
based concern about “rule of law” and respect for institutions: How can the 
criminal system embody community norms and serve a public educational 
function when so many people are incarcerated and when the public per-
ceives the system as unjust or punishment as excessive?147 While these cri-
tiques might not speak in utilitarian or consequentialist terms (e.g., “optimal 
punishment”), they present an account based on a belief that justifiable pun-
ishment has overflowed its banks. 
Of course, these critiques vary dramatically. And just because a scholar 
articulates a preferred theory of punishment or metric does not mean that 
Pfaff’s observation lacks merit—how do we know when punishment is too 
expensive or what punishment matches the exact degree of a defendant’s
culpability?148 Nevertheless, these over accounts retain a baseline assumption 
serving sentences that are far too long, and that this mass incarceration serves no legitimate 
penal or law enforcement rationale.”).
145. See, e.g., Guyora Binder & Ben Notterman, Penal Incapacitation: A Situationist Cri-
tique, 54 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 1, 3 (2017); Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Predictive Prosecution, 51 
Wake Forest L. Rev. 705, 729 (2016).
146. See United States v. Moore, 851 F.3d 666, 676 (7th Cir. 2017) (Posner, J., dissenting) 
(“Many violent offenders, moreover, age out of crime, often as early as their mid- to late-
twenties—’by the time a person in his 30s has generated a long criminal history suggesting that 
he poses a continuing risk, he is likely to have started “aging out” of crime, violent behavior in 
particular. . . . A long prison sentence also undermines someone’s ability to find the stabilizing 
influence of a job or a spouse, thus increasing the long-run risk that he will reoffend.’ ” (quot-
ing John Pfaff, A Better Approach to Violent Crime, Wall Street J. (Jan. 27, 2017, 11:58 AM), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/a-better-approach-to-violent-crime-1485536313 (on file with the 
Michigan Law Review)).
147. See, e.g., United States v. Spears, 469 F.3d 1166, 1190 (8th Cir. 2006) (Bye, J., concur-
ring in part and dissenting in part) (“Perceived improper racial disparity fosters disrespect for 
the law and lack of confidence in the criminal justice system . . . .” (quoting U.S. Sentencing 
Comm’n, Report to the Congress: Cocaine and Federal Sentencing Policy 103
(2002))), cert. granted, judgment vacated, 552 U.S. 1090, and opinion vacated in part, reinstated 
in part on reh’g, 533 F.3d 715 (8th Cir. 2008); Lissa Griffin & Ellen Yaroshefsky, Ministers of 
Justice and Mass Incarceration, 30 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 301, 321 (2017); Tracey L. Meares, 
Place and Crime, 73 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 669, 680–84 (1998).
148. See Pfaff, supra note 20, at 8–13. Indeed, Pfaff’s trenchant critiques of (the empiri-
cal aspects of) the “Standard Story” rest on places where critics’ metrics are not clear or appear 
to clash with their critiques or proposed police solutions. For example, Pfaff (like a number of 
critics who generally adopt a mass frame), emphasizes the failure to address violent crime. 
Many accounts of mass incarceration focus only on “nonviolent” crime, despite the majority of 
people incarcerated are serving time for “violent” offenses. That is, confronting the question of 
violent crime requires a reckoning with who should be incarcerated and for how long. I take 
the central thrust of Pfaff’s argument to be that if critics claim that they are focused on num-
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that some degree of punishment is necessary, and the core functions and 
structures of the criminal system are legitimate, but that the current regime 
misses the mark in advancing legitimate ends. That is, despite their norma-
tive differences, each of these accounts focuses on the first prong of Gar-
land’s definition.
But what about the second element of Garland’s definition? Is it fair to 
say that over critiques focus exclusively on element one? I think not.149 Alt-
hough race plays a different role in these critiques than the mass accounts, 
racial disparities remain a major focus of many over critiques.150 Indeed, race 
receives significant attention in many over critiques and is often used as a 
way to frame what makes overpunishment so objectionable.151 Yet, unlike 
mass critiques, over characterizations do not purport to reimagine racial hi-
erarchies in society or to provide a broader account of the relationship 
among race, law, and, power. Rather, the over critique of mass incarcera-
tion’s racial dimensions focuses on a narrower form (or forms) of inequality: 
per capita arrest and conviction rates, sentence duration, prosecutorial
charging decisions, etc. That is, the over critique targets specific instances of 
racial inequality reflected in the available data on the criminal system as spe-
cific instances in need of a fix.152
For example, take critiques of drug possession enforcement. The over
frame focuses on whether black defendants who used illegal drugs were as 
likely to be arrested and serve time as white defendants engaged in the same 
conduct.153 Certainly, the mass critic might share these concerns; but the 
over critics’ concerns would (at least ostensibly) be addressed if these rates 
were equalized, even if that meant leveling up punishment, such that more 
white defendants were arrested and charged.154 As a practical matter, it 
might well be that critics adopting an over critique of racialized drug en-
forcement would balk if the state actually began enforcing drug laws univer-
sally in an effort to equalize disparities. Nevertheless, the critiques them-
selves sound as though such a policy would be responsive. 
bers exclusively (i.e., the movement to cut the prison population in half), then the stories that 
they are telling of prisons full of nonviolent, nonrepeat, nonserious offenders are misleading.
149. Certainly, some over accounts may pay little attention to race or may mention race 
only in passing.
150. See, e.g., Spears, 469 F.3d at 1190 (Bye, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); 
Stuntz, supra note 1; Osler & Bennett, supra note 144, at 157.
151. See, e.g., Barkow & Osler, supra note 138; Conyers, supra note 45, at 378.
152. See, e.g., Sonja B. Starr & M. Marit Rehavi, Mandatory Sentencing and Racial Dispar-
ity: Assessing the Role of Prosecutors and the Effects of Booker, 123 Yale L.J. 2, 30 (2013).
153. See, e.g., Kane v. Winn, 319 F. Supp. 2d 162, 179 n.27 (D. Mass. 2004); People v. 
Price, 2016 IL App (1st) 141054-U, ¶ 130 (“Much has been written recently about whether the 
mass incarceration of black men for minor drug offenses through lengthy sentences is an abuse 
of the justice system’s discretion. I believe that it is.” (citation omitted)).
154. See Aya Gruber, Equal Protection Under the Carceral State, 112 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1337, 
1366–68 (2018) (discussing the difference between solutions to inequality that “level-up” and 
“level-down”).
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In short, comparing the mass critique to the over critique reveals some 
shared set of basic concerns. But the scope and nature of the critiques appear 
to be quite different. The next Part takes the literature on overcriminaliza-
tion as a space that reveals a similar divide.
III. Criminalization
By all accounts, “overcriminalization” entered the scholarly lexicon in 
the 1960s through the work of Sanford Kadish.155 Writing in 1967, Kadish 
lamented that “American criminal law . . . has extended the criminal sanc-
tion well beyond . . . fundamental offenses to include very different kinds of 
behavior, kinds which threaten far less serious harms, or else highly intangi-
ble ones about which there is no genuine consensus, or even no harms at 
all.”156 Kadish defines the phenomenon as a pressing one in the criminal jus-
tice system generally but concludes that it is cause for particular concern in 
“situations in which the criminal law is used: (1) to declare or enforce public 
standards of private morality, (2) as a means of providing social services in
default of other public agencies, and (3) as a disingenuous means of permit-
ting police to do indirectly what the law forbids them to do directly.”157
While its definition changed (and the number of crimes on the books 
increased),158 overcriminalization has remained a staple of criminal law liter-
155. See Erik Luna, Prosecutorial Decriminalization, 102 J. Crim. L. & Criminology
785, 785 (2012) (“As far as I can tell, Sanford Kadish coined the term ‘overcriminalization’ in a 
1962 article in the Harvard Law Review . . . .” (citing Sanford H. Kadish, Legal Norm and Dis-
cretion in the Police and Sentencing Processes, 75 Harv. L. Rev. 904, 909 (1962))).
156. Kadish, supra note 43, at 158.
157. Id. at 159.
158. See, e.g., Task Force on the Federalization of Criminal Law, Am. Bar Ass’n,
The Federalization of Criminal Law 7 (1998); Smith, supra note 39, at 538 (“Federal crim-
inal law has been growing at a breakneck pace for generations. According to a 1998 American 
Bar Association report, an incredible 40% of the thousands of federal criminal laws passed 
since the Civil War were enacted after 1970. . . . On average, Congress created fifty-seven new 
crimes every year between 2000 and 2007, roughly the same rate of criminalization from the 
two prior decades, resulting today in some 4,500 federal laws that carry criminal penalties.”
(footnotes omitted)).
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ature in the ensuing decades.159 Like “mass incarceration,” “overcriminaliza-
tion” has seen varied usage over time.160
And, as recurring law review articles illustrate, it remains a topic of continu-
ing interest to legal academics.161 “Those most closely studying the phenom-
enon regard it as a vexing problem of the criminal justice system; some say it 
is the most pressing problem in criminal law today.”162 At the same time, the 
phenomenon also has captured the imagination of judges, politicians, advo-
cates, and policy organizations.163 In 2013, the House Judiciary Committee 
159. See, e.g., Herbert L. Packer, The Limits of the Criminal Sanction 249–364 
(1968); David A.J. Richards, Sex, Drugs, Death, and the Law: An Essay on Human 
Rights and Overcriminalization (1982); Darryl K. Brown, Democracy and Decriminali-
zation, 86 Tex. L. Rev. 223, 224 (2007); John C. Coffee, Jr., Does “Unlawful” Mean “Crimi-
nal”?: Reflections on the Disappearing Tort/Crime Distinction in American Law, 71 B.U. L. 
Rev. 193, 197 (1991); John C. Coffee, Jr., Hush!: The Criminal Status of Confidential Infor-
mation After McNally and Carpenter and the Enduring Problem of Overcriminalization, 26 Am. 
Crim. L. Rev. 121 (1988); Cynthia Kwei Yung Lee, Prosecutorial Discretion, Substantial Assis-
tance, and the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 42 UCLA L. Rev. 105, 159 (1994); Pilcher, supra 
note 49, at 31 (1995).
160. Google Ngram of “overcriminalization,” “Overcriminalization,” “over - criminaliza-
tion,” “over criminalization,” and “OVERCRIMINALIZATION,” Google Books Ngram 
Viewer, http://bit.ly/2vb2Sht [https://perma.cc/MJY4-AV67]. Of course, the same caveats re-
garding the limitations of Ngram apply here as they did in the context of mass incarceration. 
Supra note 72. It is worth noting that, much as the mass incarceration data misses post-New 
Jim Crow usage, so too does the ovecriminalization data precede the publication of Douglas 
Husak’s widely cited Overcriminalization: The Limits of Criminal Law. See Husak, supra note 
3.
161. See, e.g., Zach Dillon, Foreword, 102 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 525 (2012); Ellen S. 
Podgor, Foreword, 7 J.L. Econ. & Pol’y 565 (2011) (describing the “Overcriminaization 2.0”
symposium); Ellen S. Podgor, Foreword, Overcriminalization: The Politics of Crime, 54 Am. U. 
L. Rev. 541, 541 (2005) [hereinafter Podgor, The Politics of Crime]; Symposium, Overcriminal-
ization: The Politics of Crime, 54 Am. U. L. Rev. 541 (2005).
162. Haugh, supra note 31, at 1194.
163. See, e.g., United States v. Young, 766 F.3d 621, 634 (6th Cir. 2014) (Stranch, J., con-
curring) (“Congress is well aware of the problem of over-criminalization . . . .”); Brian W. 
Walsh & Tiffany M. Joslyn, Heritage Found. & Nat’l Ass’n of Criminal Def. 
Law., Without Intent: How Congress Is Eroding the Criminal Intent Require-
ment in Federal Law (2010).
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unanimously created a taskforce on overcriminalization that met ten times 
over the following year.164
Also, much like mass incarceration, overcriminalization is a phenome-
non that has been criticized roundly from a range of political and ideological 
perspectives. Notably, for example, the Heritage Foundation and the Nation-
al Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers have frequently joined forces to 
advocate for solutions to the problem of overcriminalization and have en-
couraged further scholarship on the topic.165 However, as with mass incar-
ceration, this ostensible consensus belies deeper disagreements rooted in dif-
ferent conceptions of the phenomenon and the criminal system itself. 
Therefore, as in Part II, this Part teases out those differences by addressing 
the phenomenon through both an over and a mass frame.
A. Overcriminalization
Like “mass incarceration,” “overcriminalization” lacks a universally ac-
cepted definition.166 But, unlike the literature on mass incarceration, the lit-
erature on overcriminalization is chock full of attempts to define the phe-
nomenon.167 And, also unlike the mass incarceration literature, most of the 
164. See Congressional Task Force on Overcriminalization, Nat’l Ass’n Criminal Def. 
Law., https://www.nacdl.org/overcrimtaskforce/ [https://perma.cc/D3UV-MDYN]. The prob-
lem of overcriminalization had been a topic of interest to the Committee prior to the Task 
Force’s inception. See Reining in Overcriminalization: Assessing the Problem, Proposing Solu-
tions: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Sec. of the H. Comm. 
on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. (2010); Over-Criminalization of Conduct/Over-Federalization of 
Criminal Law: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Sec. of the H. 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. (2009); Paul J. Larkin, Jr, Public Choice Theory and Over-
criminalization, 36 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 715, 721 (2013).
165. See, e.g., Dillon, supra note 161, at 525 (“Overcriminalization is one of those rare 
topics where both the political right and political left come together. The Heritage Foundation 
and the American Civil Liberties Union joined forces to cosponsor our live Symposium and 
send the unified message that whether you are liberal, moderate, or conservative, overcriminal-
ization is an issue that can no longer be ignored. Yet, despite this bipartisan support, the ten-
dency to overcriminalize continues to grow stronger.”); Podgor, The Politics of Crime, supra
note 161, at 541 (“The Heritage Foundation and the National Association of Criminal Defense 
Lawyers (NACDL), two groups with very distinct missions, joined together with the American 
University Law Review to examine the topic of overcriminalization. Despite standing at differ-
ent points on the philosophical spectrum, the two groups recognized the grave implications of 
a criminal justice system that fails to consider increased federalization, the diminished recogni-
tion of a mens rea element in criminal statutes, and a growing prosecution of conduct that 
could be addressed via civil sanctions.”).
166. See Hopwood, supra note 40, at 703.
167. See, e.g., Chacón, supra note 11, at 648 n.182; Haugh, supra note 31, at 1194; Dmitriy 
Kamensky, American Peanuts v. Ukrainian Cigarettes: Dangers of White-Collar Overcriminali-
zation and Undercriminalization, 35 Miss. C. L. Rev. 148, 151 (2016); Larkin, supra note 43,
at 745; Luna, supra note 11, at 713–17; Geraldine Szott Moohr, Defining Overcriminalization 
Through Cost-Benefit Analysis: The Example of Criminal Copyright Laws, 54 Am. U. L. Rev. 
783, 806 (2005); Smith, supra note 39, at 539–40; Stephen F. Smith, Essay, Yates v. United 
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overcriminalization literature adopts a decidedly over frame. Put simply, 
“ ’overcriminalization’ posits that there are too many criminal laws on the 
books today,”168 and overcriminalization is a problem because “we have . . .
too many crimes in the United States.”169
In this respect, overcriminalization invites (or is embedded in) an over
frame for the criminal system—criminal law and punishment have their 
place, but the current system of criminalization has run amok. In defining 
the phenomenon, most scholars adopt a critique along the lines of Kadish’s,
but they tend to provide a set of descriptive elements or features, rather than 
a formal definition. For example, Sara Sun Beale contends that overcriminal-
ization is characterized by “(1) excessive unchecked discretion in enforce-
ment authorities, (2) inevitable disparity among similarly situated persons, 
(3) potential for abuse by enforcement authorities, (4) potential to under-
mine other significant values and evade significant procedural protections, 
and (5) misdirection of scarce resources (opportunity costs).”170 In explain-
ing how overcriminalization works in practice, Beale emphasizes two partic-
ular classes of crimes that exhibit the properties: (1) crimes that regulate 
morals; and (2) federal crimes that stretch the boundaries of federalism.171
Likewise, Erik Luna asserts that “the overcriminalization phenomenon con-
sists of: (1) untenable offenses; (2) superfluous statutes; (3) doctrines that 
overextend culpability; (4) crimes without jurisdictional authority; (5) gross-
ly disproportionate punishments; and (6) excessive or pretextual enforce-
ment of petty violations.”172 That is, the over frame indicates that overcrimi-
nalization is as much a phenomenon (i.e., the passage of too many criminal 
statutes) as it is a means of classifying certain laws (i.e., criminal statutes that 
are objectionable, unnecessarily, or illegitimate).
Just as the over critique of mass incarceration begged the question of 
baselines or metrics,173 so too does this way of thinking about overcriminali-
zation.174 As Stephen Smith observes: 
It is, of course, difficult to make such claims without a normative base-
line—an idea of what constitutes the “right” number of criminal laws—and 
such a baseline is elusive at best. Still, history and crime rates provide rele-
vant benchmarks, and they suggest that the criminal sanction is being seri-
States: A Case Study in Overcriminalization, 163 U. Pa. L. Rev. Online 147, 147 (2014) (de-
fining overcriminalization as “the existence of multitudinous, often overlapping criminal laws 
that are so poorly defined that they sweep within their ambit conduct far afield from their in-
tended target”).
168. Smith, supra note 39, at 538.
169. Husak, supra note 3, at 4.
170. Beale, supra note 11, at 749.
171. See id.
172. Luna, supra note 11, at 717.
173. See supra notes 135–138 and accompanying text.
174. See Smith, supra note 39, at 538.
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ously overused, particularly at the federal level, where overcriminalization 
has resulted in nothing less than the federalization of crime.175
Much like Pfaff’s over critiques of mass incarceration, Smith’s account right-
ly notes the problem of metrics, but then assumes that the problem is, in 
some sense, obvious: just as there are too many people in prison, there are 
too many crimes on the books.176
As with the mass incarceration literature, however, a survey of the over-
criminalization literature indicates that while many commentators agree that 
there is a problem, identifying just what constitutes overcriminalization can 
be a trickier proposition because the metrics applied vary. Indeed, the wide 
political spectrum of voices opposing overcriminalization makes the ques-
tion of baselines and normative commitments even more difficult to answer.
To the civil libertarian critic, overcriminalization represents a triumph 
of the authoritarian state and a vitiation of individual rights.177 Whether it is 
using criminal law to impose a certain vision of morality, or whether it is 
empowering police and prosecutors unduly, overcriminalization poses a 
danger to individual rights or liberties.178 Through this lens, those rights and 
liberties might be endangered by any criminal laws or law enforcement, but 
the presence of constitutional protections and a belief that some conduct 
might (or should) be criminalized keeps this from becoming an anarchic or 
abolitionist critique.179 Instead, this critique focuses on a range of criminal 
laws that often run counter to left political interests (e.g., criminalization of 
175. Id.
176. While I share Pfaff’s belief that there are too many people in prison and Smith’s be-
lief that there are too many criminal laws on the books, I do not think either conclusion is ob-
vious without some normative baseline, metric, or set of commitments. In this case, the appeal 
to history does not strike me as terribly convincing. Society and the legal system have changed 
dramatically over time. That the criminal code does not resemble criminal codes from the Ear-
ly Republic need not be a problem. (Unless, of course, one’s normative commitment was that 
any departure from eighteenth century social, legal, and political orderings would be objec-
tionable.) Indeed, a central purpose of this Article is to highlight how nonobvious these cri-
tiques of the criminal system are. Even if it were obvious (regardless of one’s normative com-
mitments) that the state criminalizes and incarcerates too much, that would tell us that there is 
a serious problem with the criminal system. But it would tell us very little about how to solve 
that problem because we still would lack a baseline against which to compare results, making it 
difficult to judge success and failure or to determine what solutions were desirable and which 
might be off the table.
177. See, e.g., Silverglate, supra note 4; Gerard E. Lynch, The Role of Criminal Law in 
Policing Corporate Misconduct, 60 Law & Contemp. Probs. 23, 34 (1997); Jordan Blair 
Woods, Decriminalization, Police Authority, and Routine Traffic Stops, 62 UCLA L. Rev. 672, 
736 (2015).
178. See generally Silverglate, supra note 4; Kadish, supra note 43.
179. Were the critique so totalizing, it would cease to be an over critique as there would 
be no baseline or optimal/acceptable rate of criminalization.
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abortion) or those that appear to go too far in empowering law enforce-
ment.180
A range of conservative and right libertarian critics shares some com-
mon ground with the left civil libertarian (e.g., fear of an oppressive state, 
concern about arbitrary enforcement, underlying faith or belief in constitu-
tional constraints and a nonauthoritarian criminal justice system).181 But, 
unlike the civil libertarian critic, the libertarian critic views overcriminaliza-
tion alongside the administrative state and aspects of the welfare state as a 
marker of unacceptable “big government.”182 The libertarian critique, then, 
often takes on a fundamentally deregulatory tone—there is too much crimi-
nal regulation, but there is also too much civil regulation.183 As a result, the 
libertarian critique tends to emphasize regulatory crimes, particularly finan-
cial and environmental crimes that may harm industry.184
Some critiques from left and right (and center) prioritize concerns for 
“rule of law” and legitimacy.185 Part of this critique rests on concerns of se-
lective enforcement and prosecutorial discretion—as William Stuntz and 
others have stressed, too many criminal statutes and/or criminal statutes that 
are too broad grant too much discretion to prosecutors.186 If people commit 
180. See, e.g., Kadish, supra note 43, at 162; Herbert L. Packer, The Aims of the Criminal 
Law Revisited: A Plea for a New Look at “Substantive Due Process,” 44 S. Cal. L. Rev. 490, 493 
(1971).
181. See generally Go Directly to Jail: The Criminalization of Almost Every-
thing (Gene Healy ed., 2004).
182. See Donald A. Dripps, Why Gideon Failed: Politics and Feedback Loops in the Re-
form of Criminal Justice, 70 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 883, 919 (2013) (“An important strand of 
contemporary conservative thought indeed sees the modern criminal justice system as big gov-
ernment with its usual defects.”).
183. See Grover Norquist, Opinion, Conservatives Must Police Bottom Line on Criminal 
Justice, Orange County Reg. (Feb. 18, 2011, 12:40 PM), http://www.ocregister.com/articles/
prison-288870-government-criminal.html [https://perma.cc/T5K6-K6F9] (“Today’s criminal 
justice system is big government on steroids, and the responsibility for taming its excesses falls 
to those committed to smaller government: conservatives.”).
184. See, e.g., Marc A. Levin, At the State Level, So-Called Crimes Are Here, There, Every-
where, Crim. Just., Spring 2013, at 4, 5 (“Excessive criminalization not only leads to injustice 
and unfairness, it also deters and even reduces productive activity. The Sarbanes-Oxley legisla-
tion and the labyrinth of rules it has spawned impose criminal penalties for accounting errors, 
and has saddled US businesses with an estimated $100 million in compliance and opportunity 
costs.”); George F. Will, Opinion, Eric Garner, Criminalized to Death, Wash. Post (Dec. 10, 
2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/george-will-eric-garner-criminalized-to-
death/2014/12/10/9ac70090-7fd4-11e4-9f38-95a187e4c1f7_story.html (on file with the Michi-
gan Law Review).
185. See, e.g., C. Jarrett Dieterle, Note, The Lacey Act: A Case Study in the Mechanics of 
Overcriminalization, 102 Geo. L.J. 1279, 1281 (2014).
186. See, e.g., Josh Bowers, Legal Guilt, Normative Innocence, and the Equitable Decision 
Not to Prosecute, 110 Colum. L. Rev. 1655, 1665 (2010) (“[S]ubstantive overcriminalization 
increases not only the need for equitable discretion, but also the risk of its misuse or abuse.”); J. 
Richard Broughton, Congressional Inquiry and the Federal Criminal Law, 46 U. Rich. L. Rev.
457, 477–78 (2012); Richard E. Myers II, Responding to the Time-Based Failures of the Criminal 
Law Through a Criminal Sunset Amendment, 49 B.C. L. Rev. 1327, 1354 (2008); William J. 
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crimes all the time (knowingly or unknowingly), then people are constantly 
at the mercy of prosecutors, allowing for pretextual and political prosecu-
tions.187 Under this view, that discretion renders criminal law un-lawlike or, 
at least, highly contingent. As Stuntz claims, “[c]riminal law is . . . not law at 
all, but a veil that hides a system that allocates criminal punishment discre-
tionarily.”188 More broadly, this critique feeds into a belief that overcriminal-
ization undermines the importance and legitimacy of the criminal system. 
As Judge Gerard Lynch argues, “[b]oth in justice to those so labeled [as crim-
inals], and to preserve the always-threatened moral capital of the criminal 
law from dilution, conviction of crime must ordinarily be reserved for those 
who violate deeply held and broadly agreed social norms.”189 Indeed, this 
claim is part of what makes these over critiques emblematic of an over
frame—they depend on strong claims about the existence of a baseline that 
makes the criminal justice system inherently legitimate.190
Returning to the lists of elements that Beale and Luna provide, it is 
worth noting that most of these over critiques focus on examples of over-
criminalization, rather than generally discussing that baseline. That in and of 
itself is not remarkable—certainly, a commentator identifying a phenome-
non should be able to provide specific, concrete examples. But it is fascinat-
ing how much of the scholarship and policy work on overcriminalization re-
lies on individual statutes or individual prosecutions. Unquestionably, the 
stories of individuals ensnared in the criminal system are a critical compo-
nent of public fascination with crime policy and are a significant driver of 
the criminal justice reform movement.191 Whether it is the proliferation of 
statutes named after crime victims,192 the rise of the Black Lives Matter 
Stuntz, Commentary, O.J. Simpson, Bill Clinton, and the Transsubstantive Fourth Amendment,
114 Harv. L. Rev. 842, 855 (2001); William J. Stuntz, The Uneasy Relationship Between Crim-
inal Procedure and Criminal Justice, 107 Yale L.J. 1, 4 (1997).
187. See generally Daniel C. Richman & William J. Stuntz, Essay, Al Capone’s Revenge: An 
Essay on the Political Economy of Pretextual Prosecution, 105 Colum. L. Rev. 583 (2005).
188. Stuntz, supra note 22, at 599.
189. Lynch, supra note 177, at 47.
190. See John G. Malcolm, Criminal Justice Reform at the Crossroads, 20 Tex. Rev. L. & 
Pol. 249, 281 (2016) (“There are, of course, certain kinds of crimes such as murder, rape, ar-
son, robbery, and fraud . . . that are clearly morally opprobrious. It is completely appropriate 
and necessary in such cases to bring the moral force of the government in the form of a crimi-
nal prosecution in order to maintain order and respect for the rule of law.”).
191. See Mission Statement, Marshall Project, https://www.themarshallproject.org/
about#.vdaFEZxjl [https://perma.cc/68PG-HRU3] (“The Marshall Project is a nonpartisan, 
nonprofit news organization that seeks to create and sustain a sense of national urgency about 
the U.S. criminal justice system. . . . In all of our work we strive to educate and enlarge the au-
dience of people who care about the state of criminal justice.”).
192. See Rachel E. Barkow, Criminal Law as Regulation, 8 N.Y.U. J.L. & Liberty 316, 
322 (2014).
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movement,193 or the success of the Innocence Project,194 personal stories and 
publicized cases shape public perception and help define the politics of 
crime. Or, as Rachel Barkow puts it, “in criminal law, stories, not data, drive 
the policy analysis.”195 Yet, the overcriminalization literature’s foreground-
ing of anecdotes presents a fascinating tension: on the one hand, most com-
mentators suggest that overcriminalization is a sweeping phenomenon; on 
the other hand, they identify one-off cases that do not necessarily appear to 
be representative. 
A laundry list of cases and statutes recur in overcriminalization litera-
ture as illustrations of criminal law’s absurd breadth. For example, a number 
of commentators cite to United States v. McNab,196 occasionally referred to 
simply as “the Honduran lobster case.”197 In McNab, the defendant was con-
victed under the Lacey Act198 and sentenced to eight years in prison for im-
porting spiny rock lobsters in violation of a Honduran regulation (which the 
government of Honduras subsequently disavowed).199 A pair of recent Su-
preme Court cases also have drawn significant attention as illustrations of 
overcriminalization: in Yates v. United States,200 a fisherman was charged 
with three felonies—”destroying property to prevent a federal seizure in vio-
lation of 18 U.S.C. § 2232(a); destroying the undersized fish—an alleged 
‘tangible object’ under Sarbanes-Oxley—to impede an investigation in viola-
tion of 18 U.S.C. § 1519; and making a false statement to a federal officer in 
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001(a)(2).”201 And, in Bond v. United States,202 a
woman was charged under a chemical weapons treaty for attempting to poi-
son a romantic rival.203 While neither of these cases explicitly addresses the 
193. See generally Amna A. Akbar, Law’s Exposure: The Movement and the Legal Acade-
my, 65 J. Legal Educ. 352 (2015).
194. See Daniel S. Medwed, Innocentrism, 2008 U. Ill. L. Rev. 1549, 1551.
195. Barkow, supra note 192, at 322.
196. 331 F.3d 1228, 1232, as amended (11th Cir. May 29, 2003).
197. See Mary Beth Buchanan et al., Panel: Criminal Law at the Federal Level, The Feder-
alist Society 2013 Executive Branch Review Conference, 18 Tex. Rev. L. & Pol. 97, 108, 114 
(2013).
198. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1701, 3371–3372 (2012).
199. McNab, 331 F.3d at 1232; see Buchanan et al., supra note 197, at 108; Larkin, supra
note 164, at 744 n.125. For additional discussion of the case in the context of overcriminaliza-
tion, see, for example, Paul J. Larkin, Jr., A Mistake of Law Defense as a Remedy for Overcrimi-
nalization, Crim. Just., Spring 2013, at 10, 12; Luna, supra note 11, at 710 & n.42; Edwin 
Meese III & Paul J. Larkin, Jr., Reconsidering the Mistake of Law Defense, 102 J. Crim. L. & 
Criminology 725, 777–82 (2012); and Matthew S. White, Note, Overcriminalization Based on 
Foreign Law: How the Lacey Act Incorporates Foreign Law to Overcriminalize Importers and 
Users of Timber Products, 12 Wash. U. Global Stud. L. Rev. 381, 388 (2013).
200. 135 S. Ct. 1074 (2015).
201. Todd Haugh, The Criminalization of Compliance, 92 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1215, 
1236 (2017); see also Cynthia Godsoe, Recasting Vagueness: The Case of Teen Sex Statutes, 74 
Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 173, 237–39 (2017); Smith, supra note 167.
202. 134 S. Ct. 2077 (2014).
203. Bond, 134 S. Ct. at 2085.
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overcriminalization phenomenon, both include critiques of prosecutorial 
discretion and the overbreadth and overly broad application of criminal 
statutes.204
The focus on statutes’ absurd application or on criminal prohibitions 
that do not pass the “laugh test” similarly are a staple in the over literature.205
One scholar suggests that “[t]he most ‘famously innocuous federal crimes’
are the ‘Woodsy Owl’ statute, which prohibits the unauthorized use of the 
character ‘Woodsy Owl,’ the name ‘Woodsy Owl,’ and the associated slogan, 
‘Give a Hoot, Don’t Pollute,’ and the federal prohibition against tearing the 
tag off a mattress.”206 Another commentator provides a list of statutes that 
criminalize conduct including: “transport[ing] water hyacinths, alligator 
grass, or water chestnut plants[,] . . . writ[ing] a check for an amount less 
than $1[, and] . . . install[ing] a toilet that uses too much water per flush.”207
And, a Twitter feed with over fifty thousand followers, “A Crime a Day,”
posts a new federal criminal law each day, highlighting esoteric laws or ap-
plications.208
To be clear, none of these accounts suggests that prisons are full of peo-
ple who have violated the “Woodsy Owl” statute, transported garden plants 
improperly, or installed high-flow toilets. Put differently, the over critique of 
overcriminalization generally does not foreground systemic punishment or 
enforcement.209 That is, the potential enforcement of statutes is a problem, as 
are some specific examples of particularly egregious enforcement, but the 
claim generally is distinct from claims regarding overpunishment or overen-
forcement.210 Instead, the focus appears to be on preserving rule of law val-
204. See Michael Pierce, The Court and Overcriminalization, 68 Stan. L. Rev. Online
50, 50–51 (2015).
205. Luna, supra note 11, at 716.
206. Mila Sohoni, The Idea of “Too Much Law,” 80 Fordham L. Rev. 1585, 1606 n.118 
(2012).
207. Malcolm, supra note 190, at 279–80.
208. See A Crime a Day (@CrimeADay), Twitter, https://twitter.com/CrimeADay
[https://perma.cc/NR5R-EWP7].
209. But see Broughton, supra note 186, at 467 (“Still others fear the problem of punish-
ment severity and mass incarceration, which are incident to the growth of federal criminal law 
and the resulting increase in prosecutions, convictions (and therefore more prisoners), and 
strained budgets and resources at a time of outrageous deficits and slow economic growth.”).
210. Husak’s work is an outlier in this respect, as it explicitly argues that it is overpun-
ishment and massive prison populations that drive his critique and make overcriminalization a 
moral and political crisis. See Husak, supra note 3, at 3 (“I argue that overcriminalization is 
objectionable mainly because it produces too much punishment.”). In this respect, Husak’s
over account of overcriminalization is inextricably tied to his over critique of mass incarcera-
tion. While both critiques adopt an over frame (i.e., predicated on a retributivist’s views about 
deserved punishment and respect for rule of law), Husak’s move to tie the two critiques makes 
his account more closely aligned with what I describe as mass critiques of overcriminalization 
(i.e., accounts fundamentally concerned with enforcement). See generally infra Section III.B. 
Donald Dripps similarly argues that too much punishment is a part of the overcriminalization 
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ues (i.e., if we all break the criminal law, how can we respect it), reducing 
prosecutorial power, and perhaps preventing any chilling effects.
Many of these over critiques are designed to highlight the absurdity or 
outrageousness of the criminal code’s breadth. Critically, though, there is an 
implicit assumption in many of these critiques about what should and 
should not be criminalized and who should and should not be subject to 
criminal penalties. For example, maybe Woodsy Owl is an easy case, but 
what about hunting on certain public lands or failure to comply with food 
safety laws? It is fair to argue that criminal law is not the best way to address 
the concerns that those statutes advance. (And, a critic adopting a mass
frame might well agree.) But that does not mean that they are easy cases. In-
deed, one of the challenges for the overcriminalization literature and the bi-
partisan over critique in this area is the question of civil versus criminal 
regulation. If a libertarian critic believed that it were wrong or absurd for the 
state to regulate civilly how a slaughterhouse employee processed meat, then 
the critic necessarily would believe that criminal regulations were even 
worse. That is, regulation is the evil to be stopped. Overcriminalization is but 
a particularly pernicious form of that evil. But what about a critic (left or 
otherwise) who believes that the state can and should regulate meat pro-
cessing civilly or administratively?211 Such a critic would need to have a theo-
ry of criminalization, or at least a way of understanding the world in which 
she could tease out the different strands of regulation and make sense of 
what punishments (civil or criminal) matched a given misdeed.212 The spec-
ter of state violence might be more immediate and ominous in the criminal
regulatory context, but that doesn’t mean state violence (or threat thereof) is 
somehow lacking in the civil regulatory context.
Proposed solutions reflecting an over critique tend to center deregulato-
ry concerns, rather than a focus on prison populations or widespread en-
forcement. For example, former Attorney General Edwin Meese has pro-
posed four fixes that Congress can employ to address overcriminalization: 
(1) consolidating most federal crimes into Title 18 of the U.S. Code; 
(2) repealing or consolidating “redundant, superfluous, and unnecessary”
criminal statutes; (3) preventing administrative agencies from defining crim-
phenomenon, but articulates his critique even more explicitly in over terms by emphasizing 
that “all agree” incarceration is appropriate in some cases. See Donald A. Dripps, Terror and 
Tolerance: Criminal Justice for the New Age of Anxiety, 1 Ohio St. J. Crim. L. 9, 12 (2003) 
(“Not only are many harmless or trivially harmful acts made crimes, but harmful wrongdoing 
that all agree should be criminal is made punishable by draconian prison terms.” (footnote 
omitted)).
211. Cf. Douglas N. Husak, Guns and Drugs: Case Studies on the Principled Limits of the 
Criminal Sanction, 23 Law & Phil. 437, 445 n.28 (2004) (noting that libertarians “have the 
virtue of consistency” on some questions of criminalization).
212. See generally Douglas Husak, Reservations About Overcriminalization, 14 New 
Crim. L. Rev. 97 (2011). Of course, despite her ostensibly more consistent approach, the lib-
ertarian critic would need to do a similar sort of justifying in order to explain why it is wrong 
for the state to regulate in many or most cases, but why the state still can use violence against 
some people who commit certain crimes.
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inal offenses; and (4) imposing heightened mens rea requirements to limit or 
eliminate strict liability crimes.213 Certainly, Meese comes from a staunchly 
conservative viewpoint and might disagree with a range of other over critics, 
but some of his proposals have found significant backing and reflect some 
version of the over critique. Therefore, it is worth considering the practical 
consequences of the proposals. 
First and foremost, the emphasis here (and throughout the overcrimi-
nalization literature) is on the federal system.214 As others have noted,215 the 
focus on the federal is misplaced, given that states do most of the policing, 
prosecuting, and imprisoning.216 Certainly scholars particularly concerned 
about federalism might want to address the problem of “over federaliza-
tion,”217 but it is not clear that a state’s decision to pass many of the objec-
tionable statutes would be less troubling than the federal government’s.218
Even aside from that concern, though, there is real reason to be skeptical 
about the practical impact of Meese’s proposals. 
Three of the four (excluding the agency one) speak to concerns about 
notice. Notice may be a critically important component of constitutional law 
and due process values,219 but it is not clear who actually would benefit from 
the calls to consolidate. That is, most people probably don’t own a bound 
copy of Title 18 and probably are not knowledgeable about the law (whether 
civil or criminal). Indeed, that observation drives much of the criticism of 
overcriminalization and that has led to greater calls for an expanded “mis-
213. Edwin Meese III, Principles for Revising the Criminal Code, Heritage Found. (Dec. 
13, 2011), https://www.heritage.org/testimony/principles-revising-the-criminal-code [https://
perma.cc/VUN7-XWGU].
214. See, e.g., Brown, supra note 159, at 231; Julie R. O’Sullivan, The Federal Criminal 
“Code” Is a Disgrace: Obstruction Statutes as Case Study, 96 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 643, 
654 (2006); Stephen F. Smith, Proportionality and Federalization, 91 Va. L. Rev. 879, 908 
(2005); Jeff Welty, Overcriminalization in North Carolina, 92 N.C. L. Rev. 1935, 1937 (2014) 
(“Virtually all the discussion of overcriminalization has focused on the federal govern-
ment . . . .”).
215. See Pfaff, supra note 20, at 13.
216. See, e.g., id. at 13–14; Welty, supra note 214, at 1937 n.7.
217. See, e.g., Kathleen F. Brickey, Criminal Mischief: The Federalization of American 
Criminal Law, 46 Hastings L.J. 1135 (1995); William H. Pryor Jr., Commentary, Federalism 
and Sentencing Reform in the Post-Blakely/Booker Era, 8 Ohio St. J. Crim. L. 515, 517 
(2011).
218. That is, unless the critique is rooted distinctly in the Commerce Clause, it is not 
clear why concerns associated with overcriminalization would or should be lessened if state 
legislatures, rather than the federal one, were passing the laws. The same concerns about the 
moral justifications and the economic costs would persist in either case.
219. See, e.g., Carissa Byrne Hessick, Vagueness Principles, 48 Ariz. St. L.J. 1137, 1139–
40 (2016); Paul H. Robinson, Fair Notice and Fair Adjudication: Two Kinds of Legality, 154 U. 
Pa. L. Rev. 335, 364 (2005).
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take of law” defense.220 To the extent that a cleaner federal code might make 
it easier to be on notice, I think it is fair to wonder about the distributive ef-
fects of that notice. That is, it may be that the better educated will be more 
likely to stay apprised of what the criminal code has to say. Perhaps more 
pointedly, notice probably would be more meaningful to a business, corpo-
ration, or wealthy individual who retained a lawyer or had a team dedicated 
to compliance. My claim is not that the wealthy should be unable to comply 
with the law, or even that I would not support Meese’s proposal, but rather 
that the proposal appears to speak only to a narrow segment of the popula-
tion—a segment of the population that looks very different from the millions 
of Americans caught up in the criminal system.221
The recommendation regarding agency authority has a similar flavor 
and appears to jibe with conservative and libertarian deregulatory takes on 
overcriminalization.222 How many defendants or prosecutions would be af-
fected remains an empirical question, but, based on available Bureau of Jus-
tice Statistics data, it seems unlikely that regulatory offenses (i.e., crimes de-
fined by agency, rather than legislature) account for a large percentage of 
prison admissions.223
Finally, mens rea reform has been both one of the most popular reform 
proposals and also one of the most contentious.224 It has been supported by 
both conservative activists and criminal defense attorneys but opposed by 
politicians and commentators on the left who believe that it would operate as 
a shield against prosecutions for financial and environmental crime.225 It is 
possible that mens rea reform might cut more broadly than other proposals 
and implicate a range of crimes and help a range of less privileged defend-
220. See Paul J. Larkin, Jr., Taking Mistakes Seriously, 28 BYU J. Pub. L. 71, 115 (2013); 
cf. Ilya Somin, Democracy and Political Ignorance: Why Smaller Government Is 
Smarter (2013) (examining the concept of political ignorance and voters’ lack of understand-
ing of the political system).
221. By way of comparison, consider Alexandra Natapoff’s description of the “penal pyr-
amid.” See generally Natapoff, supra note 12. According to Natapoff, the role of formal legal 
rules in the criminal system reflects a stratified society: at the top of the pyramid, the wealthy 
tend to live in a world that can be described by legal rules and some concept of “rule of law.”
See id. at 73. As we move down the pyramid, legal doctrine becomes increasingly less useful as 
a means of predicting outcomes or explaining individuals’ interactions with the criminal sys-
tem. See id.
222. See supra notes 181–184 and accompanying text.
223. See E. Ann Carson, Bureau of Justice Statistics, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Pris-
oners in 2013, at 16–17 (2014), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/p13.pdf [https://perma.
cc/EX73-9XR3].
224. See, e.g., Peter J. Henning, Making Sure “The Buck Stops Here”: Barring Executives 
for Corporate Violations, 2012 U. Chi. Legal F. 91, 109; Harvey Silverglate, Remarks on Re-
storing the Mens Rea Requirement, 7 J.L. Econ. & Pol’y 711 (2011); Sarah N. Welling, Reviv-
ing the Federal Crime of Gratuities, 55 Ariz. L. Rev. 417, 446 (2013).
225. See Alex Sarch, How to Solve the Biggest Issue Holding Up Criminal Justice Reform,
Politico (May 16, 2016, 5:25 AM), http://www.politico.com/agenda/story/2016/05/criminal-
justice-reform-mens-rea-middle-ground-000120 [https://perma.cc/HTW6-YEN3].
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ants. And, even if it primarily benefited people charged with corporate 
crime, it might have a broader impact on the way in which criminal statutes 
were drafted, or perhaps even the general approach to criminal punishment 
that has embraced strict liability.
Once again, that these proposals might benefit business or more affluent 
people does not mean that they are not worthy changes. But the proposals 
help illuminate the scope of the over critiques and their distance from the 
mass critiques. Indeed, each of these proposals, like the critiques from which 
they flow, depends on the belief that criminalization has run amok, but that 
the state does need tools to prosecute and incarcerate some class of individu-
als—individuals who do not need to be shielded from overcriminalization’s
reach. And, as I will discuss in Part IV, opposition to mens rea reform from 
the left indicates how tenuous and contingent the over critique may be: even 
among criminal justice reform proponents and critics of criminal law’s
reach, the political drive to use criminal law to address social problems (e.g., 
economic inequality or environmental degradation) remains high. 
B. Mass Criminalization
While the majority of the literature on overcriminalization employs the 
over frame, a certain strand (or strands) of critical writing appears to address 
questions of overcriminalization through a mass frame. To be clear (and un-
like in the context of mass incarceration), much of the literature discussed in 
this Section is not explicitly framed in terms of overcriminalization as such. 
That is, the literature addresses problems and pathologies that I think it is 
fair to classify as “overcriminalization,” but the authors do not necessarily 
invoke seminal overcriminalization literature or frame their critiques in sim-
ilar terms. Nevertheless, scholars, activists, and commentators have adopted 
a set of critiques that sound in concerns about overcriminalization, but 
through a very different lens—a mass lens, prioritizing a concern for social 
control, the role of the state, and criminal law’s function as a tool of social 
marginalization.
As a preliminary matter, it is worth noting that a limited amount of 
criminal law scholarship actually does use the phrase “mass criminaliza-
tion.”226 A certain amount of this literature appears to use “mass criminaliza-
tion” interchangeably with a traditional, over characterization of overcrimi-
nalization, often citing to over accounts or definitions.227 Other authors 
226. A Westlaw search of all law reviews and journals conducted on August 25, 2018 
yielded seventy-four articles that used the phrase.
227. See, e.g., Andrea L. Dennis, Criminal Law as Family Law, 33 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 285, 
308 (2017); Brian M. Murray, A New Era for Expungement Law Reform? Recent Developments 
at the State and Federal Levels, 10 Harv. L. & Pol’y Rev. 361, 362 n.4 (2016) (“Mass crimi-
nalization refers to the incredible expansion and enforcement of the criminal code at the state 
and federal level.” (citing Silverglate, supra note 4)); Jonathan Oberman & Kendea Johnson, 
Broken Windows: Restoring Social Order or Damaging and Depleting New York’s Poor Commu-
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appear to use “mass criminalization” as interchangeable with “mass incar-
ceration.”228
Using a more explicitly mass frame, though, other scholars use “mass 
criminalization” to refer to overcriminalization as a means of social control. 
For example, Jenny Roberts critiques overcriminalization through the frame 
of criminal records and collateral consequences for previously incarcerated 
individuals.229 Roberts’s claim is not that the wrong people have criminal 
records or that the system is failing to sort among people who are morally 
culpable and those who are not. Instead, her claim is that the effects of a 
criminal conviction have rendered a growing population of adults incapable 
of participating in society.230
Although mass incarceration is perhaps the most serious and pressing 
problem with the criminal justice system in the United States, most crimi-
nal cases are misdemeanors and often do not result in jail or prison time. 
The problem is thus better characterized as one of mass criminalization. 
Mass criminalization over the past 40 years means that about one in three 
people in the United States has some type of criminal record. Law enforce-
ment agencies have made more than a quarter of a billion arrests, and the 
FBI adds between 10,000 and 12,000 new names to its database each day. 
The result is that “the FBI currently has 77.7 million individuals on file in 
its master criminal database.”231
In this respect, Roberts’s characterization of “mass criminalization” sounds a 
great deal like Jack Chin’s characterization of mass conviction.232 The crimi-
nal system’s impact on communities and individuals transcends incarcera-
tion and implicates a range of stages in the process—from the earliest court 
involvement through collateral consequences.233
nities of Color?, 37 Cardozo L. Rev. 931, 947 (2016) (citing to Luna for the claim that we “live 
in an era of mass criminalization” (citing Luna, supra note 11, at 703–12)).
228. See, e.g., Ann Cammett, Confronting Race and Collateral Consequences in Public 
Housing, 39 Seattle U. L. Rev. 1123, 1136 (2016); Ann Cammett, Deadbeat Dads & Welfare 
Queens: How Metaphor Shapes Poverty Law, 34 B.C. J.L. & Soc. Just. 233, 236 (2014); Ann 
Cammett, Shadow Citizens: Felony Disenfranchisement and the Criminalization of Debt, 117 
Penn St. L. Rev. 349, 352–53 (2012).
229. See Jenny Roberts, Expunging America’s Rap Sheet in the Information Age, 2015 
Wis. L. Rev. 321, 340.
230. See id.; see also Benjamin Levin, Criminal Employment Law, 39 Cardozo L. Rev.
2265 (2018) (examining the exclusion of people with criminal records from formal labor mar-
kets).
231. Roberts, supra note 229, at 325–26 (footnotes omitted) (quoting Gary Fields & John 
R. Emshwiller, As Arrest Records Rise, Americans Find Consequences Can Last a Lifetime, Wall 
Street J. (Aug. 18, 2014, 10:30 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/as-arrest-records-rise-
americans-find-consequences-can-last-a-lifetime-1408415402 (on file with the Michigan Law 
Review)).
232. See supra notes 108–109 and accompanying text.
233. See also Joel Rogers, Foreword: Federalism Bound, 10 Harv. L. & Pol’y Rev. 281, 
294 (2016) (“ ’[M]ass criminalization’ is different, and affects even more people, than the more 
familiar phenomenon of ‘mass incarceration’ . . . .”).
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Another strand of mass-inflected scholarship uses “mass criminaliza-
tion” to describe over-style incarceration, but with a distinct focus on race, 
gender, immigration status, and sometimes sexuality.234 This approach is 
embodied perhaps most clearly in the work of critical race theorist Devon 
Carbado. Carbado cites to Sara Sun Beale’s work in describing mass crimi-
nalization,235 but the definition he offers goes beyond the traditional over
approach. He argues that mass criminalization is not only “the criminaliza-
tion of relatively nonserious behavior or activities,” but also “the multiple 
ways in which criminal justice actors, norms, and strategies shape welfare 
state processes and policies.”236 In this respect, he claims that mass criminali-
zation empowers police to confront black civilians “through the diffusion of 
criminal justice officials, norms, and strategies into the structure and organi-
zation of the welfare state.”237
Carbado’s account, coupled with Roberts’s, fits alongside the mass ac-
counts of mass incarceration that described a sprawling web of criminal reg-
ulation and situated it alongside (or as a part of) a mode of governance that 
marginalizes and controls populations. This vision of “mass criminalization”
is a totalizing form of control that “incorporates punitive responses to pov-
erty, employment rights, and even young children’s behavior.”238
Like the over critiques, the mass critiques address the growing universe 
of substantive criminal law, but they do so with an eye to enforcement and 
punishment, rather than with a focus on the laws themselves. That is, where 
the over critiques were often conjectural or rooted in a concern about the 
234. See, e.g., Devon W. Carbado, Blue-on-Black Violence: A Provisional Model of Some of 
the Causes, 104 Geo. L.J. 1479, 1487 (2016) [hereinafter Carbado, Blue-on-Black Violence]; 
Carbado, supra note 7, at 549; Angélica Cházaro, Challenging the “Criminal Alien” Paradigm,
63 UCLA L. Rev. 594, 610 (2016); Ingrid V. Eagly, Criminal Justice in an Era of Mass Deporta-
tion: Reforms from California, 20 New Crim. L. Rev. 12, 37–38 (2017); Ingrid V. Eagly, Im-
migrant Protective Policies in Criminal Justice, 95 Tex. L. Rev. 245, 311 (2016); Justin Hans-
ford, The First Amendment Freedom of Assembly as a Racial Project, 127 Yale L.J.F. 685, 700 
(2018); K. Babe Howell, From Page to Practice and Back Again: Broken Windows Policing and 
the Real Costs to Law-Abiding New Yorkers of Color, 34 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 439, 
439 (2010) (“The mass criminalization of people resulting from Zero Tolerance Policing and 
‘quality of life’ initiatives adopted in the mid-1990s has made it nearly impossible for a young 
man of color in our city to avoid arrest or harassment . . . .”); George Lipsitz, “In an Avalanche 
Every Snowflake Pleads Not Guilty”: The Collateral Consequences of Mass Incarceration and 
Impediments to Women’s Fair Housing Rights, 59 UCLA L. Rev. 1746, 1770 (2012); Natapoff, 
supra note 110, at 1317–18; Charles F. Sabel & William H. Simon, The Duty of Responsible 
Administration and the Problem of Police Accountability, 33 Yale J. on Reg. 165, 203–04
(2016) (describing “the mass criminalization of young minority men through aggressive mi-
nor-offense enforcement”).
235. See Carbado, Blue-on-Black Violence, supra note 234, at 1487 n.20.
236. Id. at 1487.
237. Id. at 1490.
238. Heather Schoenfeld, A Research Agenda on Reform: Penal Policy and Politics Across 
the States, 664 Annals Am. Acad. Pol. & Soc. Sci. 155, 157–58 (2016).
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theoretical or legitimacy-based costs of overcriminalization,239 the mass crit-
ics focus on enforcement and application.240 For Carbado and others focused 
on racial marginalization, the expansion of the criminal code matters be-
cause of the ways in which urban policing enforces those statutes against 
people of color.241 For Roberts and others focused on collateral consequences 
and widespread social marginalization, overcriminalization matters because 
it expands the criminal system’s reach and exposes more people to the mar-
ginalization and social stigma that accompany court involvement.242
Taking either approach, one way of understanding the mass critique of 
overcriminalization is through Jonathan Simon’s concept of “governing 
through crime.”243 In Simon’s account, starting in the latter half of the twen-
tieth century and in the years following the attacks of September 11, 2001, 
the model of government regulation became to focus on problems in terms 
of threats to security and use the criminal law to address them.244 This mode 
of governance through criminalization takes many forms.245 For example, 
Simon and others have addressed the ways in which schools (or their stu-
dents) have been criminalized.246 Problems with academic achievement, 
concerns about discipline, and worries about gangs or drugs received signifi-
cant attention, but only through a system that empowers law enforcement—
placing police in schools, ramping up “zero tolerance” policies, and shifting 
the space of the school from a place of academic discipline to a place of pure 
discipline based on the exercise of state violence.247 Via the so-called “school 
to prison pipeline,” poor children of color are effectively criminalized—
shuttled from underachieving and underfunded schools to carceral or deten-
239. See generally supra notes 209–211 and accompanying text.
240. See, e.g., Ann Cammett, Reflections on the Challenge of Inez Moore: Family Integrity 
in the Wake of Mass Incarceration, 85 Fordham L. Rev. 2579, 2580–81 (2017); Devon W. 
Carbado & Patrick Rock, What Exposes African Americans to Police Violence?, 51 Harv. C.R.-
C.L. L. Rev. 159, 163 (2016).
241. See, e.g., Carbado & Rock, supra note 240, at 163; Cházaro, supra note 234, at 610.
242. See, e.g., Roberts, supra note 229, at 325–26; Rogers, supra note 233, at 294.
243. See generally Simon, supra note 118.
244. See generally id. In this respect, Simon’s account draws from Foucault’s focus on the 
inherent links between governance and “security” as a means of the state asserting and consol-
idating its power. See Michel Foucault, Security, Territory, Population: Lectures 
at the Collège De France, 1977-78 (Graham Burchell trans., 2007); cf. Levin, supra note 
101, at 554 (arguing that this conception of the state or “governmentality” helps explain the 
political economy of modern carceral policy).
245. See generally Simon, supra note 118.
246. See, e.g., id. at 207–32; Tamar R. Birckhead, Toward a Theory of Procedural Justice 
for Juveniles, 57 Buff. L. Rev. 1447, 1496 (2009); Kristin Henning, Criminalizing Normal 
Adolescent Behavior in Communities of Color: The Role of Prosecutors in Juvenile Justice Re-
form, 98 Cornell L. Rev. 383, 386 (2013).
247. See, e.g., Henning, supra note 246, at 386; Catherine Y. Kim, Policing School Disci-
pline, 77 Brook. L. Rev. 861, 862 (2012).
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tion facilities.248 To put a finer point on it, this critique differs from the over
critique in that it is not concerned with whether a given law is justified or 
whether students have done bad things; rather, this account is focused on 
how the criminal system effectively replaces (or at least coexists with) the 
educational system as a way of managing poor children.
This style of mass critique recurs elsewhere,249 but as a final example, 
consider the highly fraught realms of intimate partner violence and sexual 
assault. These are not areas of criminal law that appear in the over overcrim-
inalization literature. To the extent that the malum in se/malum prohibitum
distinction is meaningful,250 both clearly are malum in se crimes (i.e., the 
conduct is inherently culpable). In other words, we’re a long way from 
Woodsy Owl. But a number of mass critiques have focused on these crimes 
as areas in which some form of overcriminalization is at work. 
The critiques take two forms. First, some critics argue that the criminal 
system fails to protect women of color, queer people, and other socially mar-
ginalized victims, and—in its attempts to protect them—further marginalizes 
and victimizes them.251 That is, the criminal system focuses on punishment, 
rather than prioritizing the needs and wants of the victim.252 This critique 
often sounds in the same language as the racialized “mass criminalization”
critiques.253 The concern is not one of innocence (i.e., the defendant did not 
commit the crime), ignorance (i.e., the defendant did not know it was a 
248. See, e.g., Martha Minow, In Brown’s Wake: Legacies of America’s Educa-
tional Landmark 28 (2010); Katayoon Majd, Students of the Mass Incarceration Nation, 54 
How. L.J. 343, 347 (2011); Janet E. Mosher, Lessons in Access to Justice: Racialized Youths and 
Ontario’s Safe Schools, 46 Osgoode Hall L.J. 807, 827–28 (2008).
249. See, e.g., Joey L. Mogul et al., Queer (In)Justice: The Criminalization of 
LGBT People in the United States (2011); Annette R. Appell, Protecting Children or Pun-
ishing Mothers: Gender, Race, and Class in the Child Protection System [An Essay], 48 S.C. L. 
Rev. 577, 584 (1997); Khiara M. Bridges, Privacy Rights and Public Families, 34 Harv. J.L. & 
Gender 113, 132 (2011); Kaaryn Gustafson, Degradation Ceremonies and the Criminalization 
of Low-Income Women, 3 U.C. Irvine L. Rev. 297, 300 (2013); Dorothy E. Roberts, Criminal 
Justice and Black Families: The Collateral Damage of Over-Enforcement, 34 U.C. Davis L. 
Rev. 1005, 1020–27 (2001).
250. See Benjamin Levin, American Gangsters: RICO, Criminal Syndicates, and Conspira-
cy Law as Market Control, 48 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 105, 154–57 (2013) (critiquing the dis-
tinction).
251. See, e.g., Crenshaw, supra note 81; Kimberle Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: Inter-
sectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence Against Women of Color, 43 Stan. L. Rev. 1241 
(1991); Jesse Krohn & Jamie Gullen, Mothers in the Margins: Addressing the Consequences of 
Criminal Records for Young Mothers of Color, 46 U. Balt. L. Rev. 237, 241 (2017).
252. See, e.g., Jeannie Suk, At Home in the Law: How the Domestic Violence 
Revolution Is Transforming Privacy (2009); Crenshaw, supra note 81; Francine T. 
Sherman & Annie Balck, The Nat’l Crittenton Found. & Nat’l Women’s Law Ctr.,
Gender Injustice: System-Level Juvenile Justice Reform for Girls (2015), http://
nationalcrittenton.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/Gender_Injustice_Report.pdf [https://
perma.cc/VR4K-2QXB].
253. See generally Crenshaw, supra note 81.
November 2018] The Consensus Myth in Criminal Justice Reform 307
crime), or culpability (i.e., the defendant committed the crime but is not 
morally culpable). Instead, the concern is that marginalized communities be-
ing criminalized—whether victims or alleged abusers—are being subjected 
to intrusive policing and state intrusion.254
A related strand of criticism focuses on “governance feminism” or “car-
ceral feminism.”255 Janet Halley describes “governance feminism” as a mode 
of governance in which feminists have assumed the reins of power (or at 
least access the halls of power) and have used this power to pursue feminist 
ends.256 According to Halley and her coauthors, governance feminist law re-
form projects often invoke state violence via the criminal law and:
[S]ound like fairly simple social-control projects. Method: define a wrong 
happening to women; then either criminalize it with the goal of eliminating 
it, or decriminalize women’s participation in the underlying exchange with 
the goal of liberating them in it. The highly contingent and complex rela-
tionship between law in the books and law in action—and the multitudi-
nous ways in which the legal system can be designed to shape but cannot 
control this relationship—seem to fall outside the scope of feminist con-
cern.257
Through this critical lens, criminalization projects—even if well inten-
tioned—cannot escape the flawed politics and structures of the state and the 
254. The case of Bresha Meadows has attracted significant criticism from activists fo-
cused on domestic violence who are skeptical or critical of the criminal system as the ideal 
mechanism for addressing these problems. See generally Jonah Engel Bromwich, Bresha Mead-
ows, Ohio Teenager Who Fatally Shot Her Father, Accepts Plea Deal, N.Y. Times (May 23, 
2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/23/us/bresha-meadows-father-killing.html (on file 
with the Michigan Law Review); #FreeBresha, https://freebresha.wordpress.com/ [https://
perma.cc/ZV5S-N37W]. Meadows, a fourteen-year-old black girl who allegedly sustained sig-
nificant, ongoing abuse from her father, ultimately killed him. See Bromwich, supra. Activists 
rallied around her and pointed to her case as one that demonstrated the criminal system’s fail-
ures and failures to serve the interests of black girls and women. See generally #FreeBresha,
supra.
255. See, e.g., Janet Halley, Split Decisions: How and Why to Take a Break 
from Feminism 20–22 (2006); Aziza Ahmed, When Men Are Harmed: Feminism, Queer The-
ory, and Torture at Abu Ghraib, 11 UCLA J. Islamic & Near E.L. 1, 5 (2012) (describing car-
ceral feminism as “a move towards market-based (neoliberal) and punitive rather than redis-
tributive solutions to ‘contemporary social problems’ ” (citing Elizabeth Bernstein, Militarized 
Humanitarianism Meets Carceral Feminism: The Politics of Sex Rights, and Freedom in Con-
temporary Antitrafficking Campaigns, 36 Signs 47 (2010))); Gruber, supra note 117, at 604; 
Janet Halley et al., From the International to the Local in Feminist Legal Responses to Rape, 
Prostitution/Sex Work, and Sex Trafficking: Four Studies in Contemporary Governance Femi-
nism, 29 Harv. J.L. & Gender 335, 340 (2006); Jeannie Suk, Criminal Law Comes Home, 116 
Yale L.J. 2, 70 (2006).
256. See Halley et al., supra note 255, at 340–41.
257. Id. at 420. But cf. Carolyn B. Ramsey, The Exit Myth: Family Law, Gender Roles, and 
Changing Attitudes Toward Female Victims of Domestic Violence, 20 Mich. J. Gender & L. 1
(2013) (complicating the history of criminal law responses to domestic violence).
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criminal system. Goals of equality or redistribution are easily “sub-
sum[ed] . . . into the state’s goal of managing undesirables.”258
All these critiques reflect the mass frame’s general preoccupation with 
criminal law as a mode of governance. Because “criminal law historically en-
forced and entrenched racial, gender, and socio-economic hierarchies,”259
the turn to criminal law as a regulatory regime or as a means of solving social 
problems carries with it those hierarchies and forms of structural oppres-
sion. And, the critiques of gender-based and sexualized violence demon-
strate that —unlike the over critique—mass concerns apply even when the 
social problems or the criminalized conduct are themselves violent or op-
pressive. Whether the operative description is “governing through crime,”
“neoliberal penality,” “carceral feminism,” or “mass criminalization,” the 
core concerns relate to deep-seated structural and political flaws that have 
allowed for punitive responses to crowd out redistributive ones. 
In his over account of overcriminalization, Douglas Husak asserts that “a
comprehensive theory of criminalization requires nothing less than a theory 
of the state.”260 While the mass critiques do not necessarily offer a positive 
theory of the state, their descriptive project appears to center more on a cri-
tique or critical account of the state than simply on the profusion of objec-
tionable criminal laws.
IV. The Stakes of the Distinction
The previous Parts have shown the ways in which the two different 
modes of critique play out and how they shed different light on generally ac-
cepted criminal justice system flaws. But why does the distinction matter? 
The frames are not simply different languages for describing the same prob-
lem. They are different ways of understanding what is wrong that identify 
flaws of different magnitudes and at different levels in the legal and political 
system. Therefore, adopting one frame, accepting a critique through one 
frame, or using one frame to reach policy solutions might mean alternate 
outcomes and approaches. 
As a result, understanding the ways that the two critiques differ is, in 
and of itself, important to understanding the literature and policy debates 
swirling in the contemporary moment of criminal justice reform. Appreciat-
ing the limits or tenuous nature of the critical consensus should be a key 
component of conversations about how to fix the “broken” system. But this 
Part aims to go a step further by identifying the ways in which the two cri-
258. Gruber, supra note 22, at 825. I have used the sexual violence examples as a case 
study, but this same line of critique could apply to other instances in which progressive causes 
ultimately join hands with (or are subsumed by) conservative or tough-on-crime politics.
259. Gruber, supra note 117, at 605.
260. Husak, supra note 3, at 120. Husak notes that such a theory is lacking in most ac-
counts and, for pragmatic reasons, focuses his work on the theory of criminalization, rather 
than delving into the broader theory of the state. See id.
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tiques might interact and the potential costs of a turn to the over critique to 
address mass concerns or serve mass ends.
A. Over Limitations
This Article proceeds from the premise that a significant amount of 
criminal law scholarship and reform work adopts the over frame.261 For 
scholars seeking to communicate with policymakers, prosecutors, and judg-
es, the over frame probably has significant appeal. By framing the criminal 
system’s problems explicitly in terms of an optimal and a suboptimal, this 
approach tees up policy solutions more easily. That is, even if many scholars 
adopting this frame do not articulate clearly just what the optimal rate of 
criminalization or incarceration is,262 their critiques make it easier for poli-
cymakers, judges, and prosecutors to identify or remedy problems: the 100:1 
crack/powder sentencing disparity is too great and needs be reduced;263 the 
criminalization of marijuana possession is indefensible and should be abol-
ished;264 the resources used to prosecute and incarcerate “nonviolent offend-
ers” are better spent on other prosecutions or other corners of the criminal 
system.265
In that respect, the over frame avoids the pragmatic concerns that the 
mass frame might introduce. The optimal and suboptimal (even if framed in 
more philosophical terms by retributivists, expressivists, or incapacitation-
ists) sound in the canon of policy arguments.266 They help make the over
frame—whatever its operative normative motivation—the recognizable 
province of or discourse for the liberal reformist project.267 Even when level-
261. Cf. Capers, supra note 35, at 591 (“Certainly, much of this conversation is attributa-
ble to the numbers. We live in a country that, between 1970 and 2005, increased its prison 
population by 628%, where one in every one hundred persons is behind bars, and where our 
prisons and jails now hold about 2.2 million individuals.”).
262. See generally supra text accompanying notes 135–138, 173–176.
263. See, e.g., David A. Sklansky, Cocaine, Race, and Equal Protection, 47 Stan. L. Rev.
1283 (1995); William Spade, Jr., Beyond the 100:1 Ratio: Towards a Rational Cocaine Sentenc-
ing Policy, 38 Ariz. L. Rev. 1233, 1254–56 (1996).
264. See, e.g., Douglas N. Husak, Legalize This!: The Case for Decriminaliz-
ing Drugs (2002); Buchhandler-Raphael, supra note 44, at 336 (collecting sources).
265. See, e.g., Bruce L. Benson, Escalating the War on Drugs: Causes and Unintended 
Consequences, 20 Stan. L. & Pol’y Rev. 293, 351 (2009); William W. Berry III, Eighth 
Amendment Presumptions: A Constitutional Framework for Curbing Mass Incarceration, 89 S. 
Cal. L. Rev. 67, 96 (2015).
266. See generally Duncan Kennedy, The Disenchantment of Logically Formal Legal Ra-
tionality, or Max Weber’s Sociology in the Genealogy of the Contemporary Mode of Western Le-
gal Thought, 55 Hastings L.J. 1031, 1075 (2004).
267. I use “liberal” here in the sense of “liberal legalism,” rather than in the sense of “lib-
eral Democrat.” See generally Karl Klare, Law-Making as Praxis, Telos, Summer 1979, at 123, 
132 n.28 (“I mean by ‘liberal legalism’ the particular historical incarnation of legalism . . .
which characteristically serves as the institutional and philosophical foundation of the legiti-
macy of the legal order in capitalist societies. Its essential features are the commitment to gen-
eral ‘democratically’ promulgated rules, the equal treatment of all citizens before the law, and 
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ing stinging critiques at the criminal system, the over critic need not reject 
the system as a whole: by decrying a “broken” system, the over approach still 
retains a “good government” valence.268 If only we could tweak the rules and 
the actors’ incentive, the over critique tells us, we could start to right the ship. 
There may be many major problems to address, and there may be a long way 
to go in order to fix them, but the fundamental project of the U.S. criminal 
system and its core tools (prisons, state violence, etc.) are not up for de-
bate.269 We can tackle fundamental criminal justice policies without address-
ing underlying structures of power (e.g., voting rights, economic inequality, 
or the long hangover of segregation in jobs, housing, and schools).
Agree or disagree, that line of critique and that approach sound like the 
ways a scholar might speak convincingly to a legislator considering a piece of 
criminal justice reform legislation.270 Even if the ask is a big one (e.g., reduce 
sentences dramatically for a broad range of defendants; decriminalize previ-
ously criminal conduct), it is framed in manageable or recognizable terms. 
The mass frame, on the other hand, sounds in a very different discourse. 
Foregrounding questions of political economy, race, class, and power, the 
mass frame (at least potentially) raises questions about all aspects of the 
criminal system and the political economy in which it is embedded. It 
sounds not in the language of small-bore solutions or narrow, pragmatic fix-
es, but in terms of sweeping systemic critique. Rather than telling a judge 
that she should rethink some sentencing determinations or telling a legisla-
tor that she should resist the impulse to draft another criminal statute, the 
mass scholar speaks a radical language of deep social ills and social injury. As 
discussed above and in the next Section, this is not to say that the mass frame 
does not provide or invite policy solutions—it certainly does. It is to say that 
the critique itself sounds in an academic or ideological discourse that is at 
best skeptical about capitalism and the fundamental structures of the crimi-
nal system. In that respect, it is no surprise that the mass frame originated 
(and appears to retain significant purchase) in sociological and criminologi-
cal literatures where first principles questions of political economy and dis-
the radical separation of morals, politics and personality from judicial action. Liberal legalism 
also consists of a complex of social practices and institutions that complement and elaborate 
on its underlying jurisprudence. With respect to its modern Anglo-American form these in-
clude adherence to precedent, separation of the legislative (prospective) and judicial (retro-
spective) functions, the obligation to formulate legal rules on a general basis (the notion of ra-
tion decidendi), adherence to complex procedural formalities, and the search for specialized 
methods of analysis (‘legal reasoning’).”); see also Ahmed A. White, Victims’ Rights, Rule of 
Law, and the Threat to Liberal Jurisprudence, 87 Ky. L.J. 357, 358 (1999).
268. See generally Klare, supra note 267 (explaining this mode of rationale legal reason-
ing).
269. Cf. Kennedy, supra note 266, at 1075 (“In policy argument, a major question is 
whether the rule proposed will be adequately calculable . . . .”).
270. For a critical take on this approach, see generally Pierre Schlag, Normative and No-
where to Go, 43 Stan. L. Rev. 167, 178–80 (1990).
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tributive consequences are more prevalent.271 Where the law review article as 
a general matter includes a final policy proposal,272 articles in these and other 
allied fields in the humanities and social sciences need not contain such an 
explicit endorsement, making this mode of critique more easily recognizable 
and acceptable. Similarly, the law’s, legal academics’, and legal scholarship’s
relationship to judges, practitioners, and policymakers complicates a turn to 
such a critical frame—if the lawyer-scholar’s comparative advantage comes 
from her grounding in the practical aspects of the law and legal practice,273
then does she give ground by adopting a less quantifiable or more heavily 
theoretical frame?274
All this is to say that the over turn that much contemporary legal schol-
arship and commentary reflects is neither surprising nor illogical. Indeed, it 
makes a lot of sense, and it is an invaluable part of both the criminal justice 
reform literature and movement. But I think that this turn is not costless. 
That is, the pragmatism it reflects masks pragmatic concerns about its adop-
tion. Or, put simply, different characterizations of a problem invite different 
solutions. Framing mass problems as over problems means advocating for or 
endorsing over solutions, not mass solutions.
By way of example, consider marijuana legalization (or, at least, decrim-
inalization). As described above, the criminalization of marijuana possession 
is a frequent target of the overcriminalization literature.275 Similarly, over cri-
tiques of mass incarceration frequently focus on marijuana possession (and 
other “nonviolent” drug crimes) as indicative of unduly harsh sentencing 
policy and the existence of a prison population that does not necessarily de-
serve to be incarcerated.276 Put simply, then, legalizing marijuana would be a 
big win and a big step forward in addressing over critiques.
271. See generally supra Section II.A.
272. Cf. Stuntz, supra note 22, at 507 (“Consider two defining features of criminal law’s
large literature. First, it is relentlessly normative. Almost all writing about American criminal 
law argues that some set of criminal liability rules is morally wrong or socially destructive, and 
that a different (usually narrower) set of rules would be better.”).
273. See id.; cf. Klare, supra note 267, at 132 n.28 (“The rise and elaboration of the ideolo-
gy, practices and institutions of liberal legalism have been accompanied by the growth of a spe-
cialized, professional caste of experts trained in manipulating ‘legal reasoning’ and the legal 
process.”).
274. See, e.g., Harry T. Edwards, Essay, Another Look at Professor Rodell’s Goodbye to 
Law Reviews, 100 Va. L. Rev. 1483, 1484 (2014); Harry T. Edwards, The Growing Disjunction 
Between Legal Education and the Legal Profession, 91 Mich. L. Rev. 34, 35 (1992). But see
Pierre Schlag, Writing for Judges, 63 U. Colo. L. Rev. 419, 422 (1992) (“[T]he academic prac-
tice of writing for judges increasingly appears as a degraded art-form used to communicate 
with persons who are not listening in order to achieve nothing very much whatsoever.”).
275. See, e.g., Buchhandler-Raphael, supra note 44, at 336; Ekow N. Yankah, A Paradox 
in Overcriminalization, 14 New Crim. L. Rev. 1, 3–4 (2011); Darryl K. Brown, Can Criminal 
Law Be Controlled?, 108 Mich. L. Rev. 971, 981–82 (2010) (reviewing Husak, supra note 3).
276. See e.g., Yankah, supra note 275, at 3.
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But what about mass critiques? Presumably, many scholars and advo-
cates who embrace mass critiques would support marijuana legalization277—
it would be a small step toward getting the state out of the business of regu-
lating criminally; it would eliminate a class of crimes that lead to many po-
lice stops and that are disproportionately enforced against poor people of 
color; and it would reduce, in small part, the number of people exposed to 
the criminal system and subjected to the universe of formal and informal 
collateral consequences of conviction and arrest. Yet, the mass critique 
speaks to deeper flaws than a single statute (or set of statutes) might ad-
dress.278 If the concern is with the state governing through crime, then why 
should we think that police and prosecutors wouldn’t use other criminal 
provisions to adopt a similar approach to regulating the underclass(es)?279 If 
the concern is with how prisons and police function, then it is not clear that 
removing one crime—even an indefensible crime—from the books would 
get at the real problem. Decriminalizing marijuana would be a victory in bat-
tle, not a seminal win to end the war.
Or, think back to the case of the “nonviolent” offender.280 At this point, 
it should go without saying that most of the literature on the criminal system 
would support a gentler approach to such a defendant. But, from a mass per-
spective, a reform agenda that emphasizes the nonviolent offender has a 
couple of serious problems. 
First, this approach would have little to say about the majority of people 
currently serving time.281 Therefore, a reform movement, ethos, or package 
of proposals based on saving the “nonviolent” individuals has serious limita-
tions.282 Not only would it have a low ceiling in terms of its potential for re-
ducing prison populations, but it would also risk significant backlash. For 
example, consider President Obama’s clemency grants for “nonviolent drug 
offenders.”283 In commuting a number of sentences, the Obama Administra-
tion stressed that the recipients of executive mercy were deserving in part 
277. See, e.g., Michelle Alexander, Opinion, In Legalizing Marijuana, End the Racial Bias,
N.Y. Times: Room for Debate (May 22, 2013), https://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/
2013/05/22/how-can-marijuana-be-sold-safely/in-legalizing-marijuana-end-the-racial-bias (on 
file with the Michigan Law Review).
278. See Forman, Locking Up Our Own, supra note 48, at 220.
279. Cf. Natapoff, Misdemeanor Decriminalization, supra note 110, at 1058–61 (examin-
ing the hidden costs of decriminalization).
280. See supra notes 47–51 and accompanying text.
281. See Forman, Locking Up Our Own, supra note 48, at 220; Pfaff, supra note 20, at 
31–35.
282. See Gottschalk, supra note 16, at 116.
283. See Charlie Savage, Obama Commutes Sentences for 8 in Crack Cocaine Cases, N.Y. 
Times (Dec. 19, 2013), https://www.nytimes.com/2013/12/20/us/obama-commuting-
sentences-in-crack-cocaine-cases.html (on file with the Michigan Law Review); Commutations 
Granted by President Barack Obama (2009-2017), U.S. Dep’t Justice, https://www.justice.gov/
pardon/obama-commutations [https://perma.cc/H9NA-M43D].
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because they had not committed “violent” crimes and, therefore, were not 
dangerous.284 When news circulated that some of the individuals to be re-
leased had been convicted of possessory gun charges, some conservative pol-
iticians and commentators grew outraged.285 Focusing on the “nonviolent 
offenders” might have seemed like the least risky move politically,286 but the 
line between violent and nonviolent is fuzzy,287 and predicating reform on 
only the “most deserving” has serious drawbacks because of the difficulty of 
finding anyone (incarcerated or otherwise) who can stand up to heavy scru-
tiny and be found blameless. 
Second, this approach serves to legitimate the system and its treatment 
of “violent” offenders. As Pfaff explains, “the rhetoric and tactics used to 
push through reforms for lower-level offenses often explicitly involve impos-
ing even harsher punishments on those convicted of violent crimes.”288 For 
example, even in criticizing the criminal system and announcing plans to as-
sist “nonviolent offenders,” President Obama explicitly stated that “violent 
criminals . . . need to be in jail” and that he “tend[ed] not to have a lot of 
284. The Administration sought clemency petitions and explained that they would prior-
itize petitions that met the following criteria:
(1) the inmate is currently serving a federal sentence in prison and has served at least 10 
years of her/his sentence; (2) the inmate likely would have received a substantially lower 
sentence if convicted of the same offense(s) under the guidelines in effect today; (3) the 
inmate is a non-violent, low-level offender without significant ties to large scale crimi-
nal organizations, gangs or cartels and without a significant criminal history; and (4) 
the inmate has demonstrated good conduct in prison and has no history of violence 
prior to or during the current term of imprisonment.
Sanjay K. Chhablani, Legitimate Justice: Using Clemency to Address Mass Incarceration, 16 U. 
Md. L.J. Race Religion Gender & Class 48, 51 (2016).
285. See, e.g., Heather Mac Donald, Obama Continues His Crusade Against a Criminal-
Justice System He Derides as Racist, Nat’l Rev. (Aug. 4, 2016, 10:16 PM), https://www.national
review.com/2016/08/obama-releases-prisoners-guilty-gun-crimes/ [https://perma.cc/G9X4-7N
6S] (“That so many of recipients of Obama’s clemency were armed and dangerous shows how 
distorted the dominant narrative about ‘mass incarceration’ is.”); Bill Otis, When the Mask 
Drops, Crime & Consequences (Dec. 26, 2016, 9:14 PM), http://www.crimeandconsequences
.com/crimblog/2016/12/when-the-mask-drops.html [https://perma.cc/H5PD-A9G9] (“When 
pro-criminal groups thought (or fooled themselves into thinking) that they had a chance for 
federal sentencing ‘reform,’ what they said they envisioned was sentencing reduction for ‘low 
level, non-violent’ offenders. If you’ve read that phrase once, you’ve read it a million times. 
Now that these groups understand they have no chance at such ‘reform’ for the foreseeable 
future, they let us in on what the plan actually was. The stuff about ‘low level, non-violent’ of-
fenders was a head fake.”); David Sherfinski & Stephen Dinan, Obama’s Forgiveness of Gun 
Crimes amid Push for Controls ‘Incredible Hypocrisy,’ Wash. Times (Aug. 9, 2016), http://
www.washingtontimes.com/news/2016/aug/9/obamas-forgiveness-of-gun-crimes-amid-push-
for-con/ [https://perma.cc/6C2J-3YR8].
286. See Forman, Locking Up Our Own, supra note 48, at 229 (“Defenders of the non-
violent-offenders-only approach suggest that it is just a start. Reform must begin with nonvio-
lent offenders, they say, but others might benefit later.”); cf. Pfaff, supra note 20, at 23 (de-
scribing drug sentences as “low-hanging fruit” in the quest to reform the criminal system).
287. See supra note 47.
288. Pfaff, supra note 20, at 23.
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sympathy when it comes to violent crime.”289 One way of making “nonvio-
lent offenders” appear more sympathetic is to provide them with a foil—
those “violent” criminals who are not in need of mercy, compassion, or at 
least greater thought and consideration. This approach “effectively mark[s] 
this larger group of violent offenders as permanently out-of-bounds.”290
That is, by adopting an over frame to target the most glaring problems, 
mass critics risk playing into a dynamic by which “criminal justice reform’s
first step—relief for nonviolent drug offenders—could easily become its 
last.”291 Over grants politicians political cover, but that cover comes with 
risks.
By way of analogy, Carol and Jordan Steiker—staunch opponents of 
capital punishment—have argued that antideath penalty advocacy strategies 
that focused on methods of execution, rather than execution itself, may have 
had an unintended legitimating effect.292 While the advocacy strategy made 
sense in light of Supreme Court politics and precedent, it also effectively 
conceded the death penalty’s legitimacy—the arguments advanced indicated 
that the death penalty itself was not unconstitutional; rather, using a given 
drug or execution method made the death penalty unconstitutional.293 Im-
portantly, their claim is not that advocates should not have made these ar-
guments or used the line of legal argument available to them. Instead, they 
worry about the unintended consequences of such a move.294
Ultimately, part of what makes Pfaff’s critique of the “standard story” so 
important is the way in which it shows the limitations of the over frame. 
That is, while Pfaff himself adopts an over frame (defining mass incarcera-
289. Forman, Locking Up Our Own, supra note 48, at 221 (first quoting President 
Barack Obama, Speech to NAACP (July 14, 2015), then quoting Office of the Press Sec’y, The 
White House, Press Conference by the President (July 15, 2015), https://obamawhitehouse
.archives.gov/the-press-office/2015/07/15/press-conference-president [https://perma.cc/FW4
Q-WLT3]).
290. Id. at 230; cf. Levin, supra note 250, at 151–64 (examining the role of criminal law in 
drawing lines between excusable and inexcusable wrongdoing).
291. Forman, Locking Up Our Own, supra note 48, at 230.
292. See e.g., Steiker & Steiker, supra note 21; cf. Gary Peller, Race Consciousness, 1990 
Duke L.J. 758, 775 (making a similar claim with regard to antidiscrimination law).
293. See Steiker & Steiker, supra note 21, at 404–12.
294. See id.; cf. Jennifer S. Hendricks, Converging Trajectories: Interest Convergence, Jus-
tice Kennedy, and Jeannie Suk’s “The Trajectory of Trauma,” 110 Colum. L. Rev. Sidebar 63 
(2010) (arguing that consideration of unintended consequences should not disregard the sorts 
of constraints that shape advocates’ strategies and decision making); Jeannie Suk, The Trajecto-
ry of Trauma: Bodies and Minds of Abortion Discourse, 110 Colum. L. Rev. 1193 (2010) (ex-
amining the unintended consequences of feminist advocates’ use of trauma discourse). It is 
worth noting that many of the critiques that this Article describes come from academics, not 
just advocates. Without veering into deeper questions of advocacy strategies (whether before 
courts, legislators, or others), then, we should recognize that academics may be, and often are, 
not similarly situated to movement lawyers in terms of their constraints, audiences, etc.
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tion in over terms and thinking largely quantitatively about the problem),295
his account highlights how the over frame often has gotten it wrong. By 
looking at problems in over terms—particularly by overstating the role of 
nonviolent crime and the federal system—critics have arrived at critiques 
that invite ill-fitting solutions. It may be that decriminalizing marijuana, 
ending prosecutions of a range of low-level “nonviolent” conduct, etc. would 
have significant positive results in society. But, if the claim is that such 
moves will cut the prison population in half, then Pfaff shows that such ap-
proaches are off base. Much like Meese’s proposals to fix overcriminaliza-
tion,296 these solutions are solutions to one problem; it just is not clear 
whether it is the same problem that the critics claim to be addressing.
B. Mass Pragmatism
To be clear, though, this Article is meant to be neither a call for ideologi-
cal purity nor a critique of incrementalism. To that end, the over/mass dis-
tinction is not intended to be a stand-in (or disguise) for the incremental/
radical distinction.297 Indeed, while the mass critique is fundamentally radi-
cal and sweeping, that does not mean that the critique is incompatible with 
pragmatism or incremental reforms.298 Existing mass critiques—both inside 
and outside of the academy—often do include concrete steps or policy solu-
tions designed to redistribute political, social, and economic power.299
Putting aside, for a moment, a range of over-style policy solutions that 
would address mass concerns (e.g., drug decriminalization; ending mandato-
ry minimum sentencing), it is important to recognize that many of the most 
vital criminal justice reform efforts on the ground reflect a mass approach.300
For example, consider the movements to end cash bail and the push to re-
duce fines and fees in the criminal system. 
In recent years, scholars and activists have focused on the problem of 
cash bail: people who cannot afford bail must languish in jail as they await 
295. See supra notes 119–129 and accompanying text.
296. See supra notes 213–225 and accompanying text.
297. But cf. Bibas, supra note 14, at 61 (describing the difference between a “radical” and 
a “meliorist” approach to criminal justice reform and describing the “radical” approach as 
“condemn[ing] lesser reforms as papering over injustice”).
298. Cf. Susan R. Klein & Jordan M. Steiker, Foreword, 84 Tex. L. Rev. 1687, 1688 
(2006) (“Marie Gottschalk’s article takes aim at the present carceral state and analyzes the po-
litical prospects for major reform. Gottschalk is not interested in tinkering with the machinery 
of the carceral state, but seeks a wholesale dismantling with the goal of reducing state and fed-
eral imprisonment rates by more than 75%. Her article offers a pragmatic assessment of the 
plausible sources of such ambitious reform, including fiscal conservatives, civil rights groups, 
international advocates, professional organizations (e.g. the ABA), and the judiciary.”). But see
Bibas, supra note 14, at 61 (“That radical approach is impractical.”).
299. See Akbar, supra note 59, at 20; see also Platform, Movement for Black Lives,
https://policy.m4bl.org/platform/ [https://perma.cc/9VNZ-3NUR].
300. See Akbar, supra note 59, at 7–8 (arguing for a more serious scholarly and legal en-
gagement with radical activism by heavily policed and incarcerated communities).
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trial or resolution of their case.301 The movement to address cash bail gained 
steam following the suicide of Kalief Browder, a young man who spent three 
years incarcerated at Riker’s Island awaiting trial for allegedly stealing a 
backpack.302 The over response to the problem focuses on whether the right 
people are being detained (i.e., courts should use algorithms to determine if a 
given defendant poses a societal danger); if so, she should remain in custody 
pretrial.303 That response addresses over concerns (i.e., more people are be-
ing detained than necessary). That said, mass responses reflecting different 
concerns and priorities have attracted significant attention and backing. 
Perhaps most notable has been the rise of the community bail fund—a fund 
established by community members to pay bail for people awaiting trial.304
The idea being that the court is detaining defendants in the name of the 
community, but the community does not believe that the court represents its 
voice(s).305 This mass approach to the problem does not focus on optimizing 
detention; rather, its goal is to resituate power and voice in the criminal sys-
tem.306 By providing bail money to defendants, community members are 
able to override official decisions that might have disparate impacts or that 
might not accurately reflect popular will.307 As a part of a broader political 
project of community empowerment and a less punitive criminal system, the 
bail fund represents an incremental solution.
301. See, e.g., Thomas B. Harvey, Jailing the Poor, 42 Hum. Rts., no. 3, 2017, at 16; Paul 
Heaton et al., The Downstream Consequences of Misdemeanor Pretrial Detention, 69 Stan. L. 
Rev. 711, 777 (2017); Candace McCoy, Tribute, Caleb Was Right: Pretrial Decisions Determine 
Mostly Everything, 12 Berkeley J. Crim. L. 135, 141 (2007); Oberman & Johnson, supra note 
227, at 933 n.8 (collecting sources); Liana M. Goff, Note, Pricing Justice: The Wasteful Enter-
prise of America’s Bail System, 82 Brook. L. Rev. 881, 883 (2017); Margaret Talbot, The Case 
Against Cash Bail, New Yorker (Aug. 25, 2015), http://www.newyorker.com/news/news-
desk/the-case-against-cash-bail (on file with the Michigan Law Review).
302. See generally Jennifer Gonnerman, Before the Law, New Yorker (Oct. 6, 2014), 
http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2014/10/06/before-the-law (on file with the Michigan 
Law Review); Jennifer Gonnerman, Kalief Browder, 1993–2015, New Yorker (June 7, 2015), 
http://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/kalief-browder-1993-2015 (on file with the Mich-
igan Law Review).
303. See generally Shima Baradaran & Frank L. McIntyre, Predicting Violence, 90 Tex. L. 
Rev. 497, 556–57 (2012) (collecting sources).
304. See generally Jocelyn Simonson, Bail Nullification, 115 Mich. L. Rev. 585, 593–606 
(2017).
305. See id. at 633; cf. Jenny Carroll, The Jury as Democracy, 66 Ala. L. Rev. 825, 870 
(2015) (“[J]ury composition should be reimagined as a forum to embrace the citizen’s fluid 
identity and to promote diverse perspectives within democracy.”).
306. See Simonson, supra note 304, at 633–34.
307. Cf. Akbar, supra note 59; Eric J. Miller, Challenging Police Discretion, 58 How. L.J.
521, 545 (2015) (discussing the role of community participation in overriding police policy); 
Jocelyn Simonson, Copwatching, 104 Calif. L. Rev. 391, 392 (2016) (arguing that filming po-
lice empowers otherwise marginalized communities in the criminal system); Jocelyn Simon-
son, The Criminal Court Audience in a Post-Trial World, 127 Harv. L. Rev. 2173, 2174 (2014) 
(making a similar claim in the context of court observation).
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Relatedly, media coverage has helped shed light on the problem of fines 
and fees in the criminal system, and a range of scholars and activists have 
taken up the cause.308 Like the cash bail issue, this is a problem deeply rooted 
in issues of economic and racial justice.309 Poor arrestees and defendants of-
ten wind up deep in debt, rearrested, or incarcerated because they are unable 
to pay fines or fees that courts and police departments impose.310 The cri-
tique of this practice is fundamentally a mass one, rather than an over one: 
the issue is not that the fines should be lower, that the wrong class of defend-
ants is being fined, or even that the fines or fees are sometimes levied against 
people who have not been convicted. Rather, the concern is that the criminal 
system is driving people further into poverty and helping to drive a cycle in 
which people remain court-involved after their case is resolved. In some cas-
es, the state and law enforcement entities are enriching themselves on the 
backs of poor and marginalized defendants. This line of criticism and law 
reform, then, explicitly confronts the place of the criminal system as a driver 
of inequality and as inextricably linked to distributive justice. A growing 
body of scholarship addresses these issues, and advocates are working to end 
these practices via impact litigation and legislative activism.311
While these are only two examples, they both demonstrate the capacity 
of mass critiques to translate into on-the-ground legal and policy solutions. 
That is, while the critique itself may be sweeping and less appealing as a way 
308. See generally Alexes Harris, A Pound of Flesh: Monetary Sanctions as 
Punishment for the Poor (2016); Laura I Appleman, Nickel and Dimed into Incarceration: 
Cash-Register Justice in the Criminal System, 57 B.C. L. Rev. 1483 (2016); Neil L. Sobol, 
Fighting Fines & Fees: Borrowing from Consumer Law to Combat Criminal Justice Debt Abuses,
88 U. Colo. L. Rev. 841, 844 (2017); Note, State Bans on Debtors’ Prisons and Criminal Jus-
tice Debt, 129 Harv. L. Rev. 1024 (2016).
309. See, e.g., Tamar R. Birckhead, The New Peonage, 72 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1595, 
1659 (2015); Olivia C. Jerjian, The Debtors’ Prison Scheme: Yet Another Bar in the Birdcage of 
Mass Incarceration of Communities of Color, 41 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 235, 257–61 
(2017); Larry Schwartzol, The Role of Courts in Eliminating the Racial Impact of Criminal Jus-
tice Debt, in Nat’l Ctr. for State Courts, 2017 Trends in State Courts: Fines, Fees, and 
Bail Practices; Challenges and Opportunities 14 (2017), http://www.ncsc.org/~/media/
Microsites/Files/Trends%202017/Eliminating-Racial-Impact-Trends-2017.ashx [https://
perma.cc/TPA2-TSC2]; Developments in the Law—Policing, 128 Harv. L. Rev. 1723, 1724 
(2015).
310. See generally Torie Atkinson, Note, A Fine Scheme: How Municipal Fines Become 
Crushing Debt in the Shadow of the New Debtors’ Prisons, 51 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 189
(2016).
311. See, e.g., ODonnell v. Harris Cty., 251 F. Supp. 3d 1052, 1168 (S.D. Tex. 2017); Cain 
v. City of New Orleans, 184 F. Supp. 3d 349, 352 (E.D. La. 2016) (basing Fourteenth Amend-
ment claim on method of collecting fines and fees from defendants); Abby Shafroth & Larry 
Schwartzol, Nat’l Consumer Law Ctr. & Criminal Justice Policy Program, Con-
fronting Criminal Justice Debt: The Urgent Need for Comprehensive Reform (2016), 
http://cjpp.law.harvard.edu/assets/Confronting-Criminal-Justice-Debt-The-Urgent-Need-for-
Comprehensive-Reform.pdf [https://perma.cc/SG2G-WQW9]; Beth A. Colgan, Reviving the 
Excessive Fines Clause, 102 Calif. L. Rev. 277 (2014); Sarah Geraghty, Keynote Remarks: How 
the Criminalization of Poverty Has Become Normalized in American Culture and Why You 
Should Care, 21 Mich. J. Race & L. 195 (2016).
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to frame legal or policy arguments, it is important to recognize that the mass
critique can yield mass reform movements and interventions that are prag-
matic and incremental in scope.312 It might be that these movements find 
support among some critics adopting an over frame, just as it may well be 
that mass critiques support over-inflected solutions. But recognizing the dif-
ferent motivations, priorities, frames, and goals should be an important 
component of our understanding of the criminal justice reform movement 
as a collection of—at times complementary, and at times contradictory—
movements.
Conclusion
In his powerful account of race and criminal justice in Washington, 
D.C., Forman argues that mass incarceration is the product of “a series of 
small decisions, made over time, by a disparate group of actors.”313 There-
fore, “mass incarceration will likely have to be undone in the same way.”314 I 
agree with Forman that fixing the criminal system will require many differ-
ent decisions, interventions, and solutions. Indeed, as in many contexts, the 
perfect may be the enemy of the good, and recognizing the promises of a 
range of criminal justice reforms and reformers is and will be critical to the 
movement’s success. But, in order to reform a system, we need to know what 
is wrong with it, and what “reform” means. Ultimately, this Article argues 
that the literature on criminal justice reform reflects two distinct ways of un-
derstanding the system and its flaws. While cooperation and compromise 
will be essential to addressing the broken and unjust system, glossing over 
disagreement and nuance risks losing the power of the critiques that got us 
to this moment of possibility in the first place.
312. Cf. Akbar, supra note 59, at 22–30 (describing the policy “demands” adopted by the 
Movement for Black Lives).
313. Forman, Locking Up Our Own, supra note 48, at 229.
314. Id.
